Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/194

What more, therefore, can we ask to distinguish the Sentiments, dependant on Humanity, from those connected with any other Passion, or to satisfy us why the former is the Origin of Morals, and not the latter? Whatever Conduct gains my Approbation, by touching my Humanity, procures also the Applause of all Mankind, by affecting the same Principle in them: But what serves my Avarice or Ambition pleases only these Passions in me, and affects not the Avarice or Ambition of the rest of Mankind. No Conduct, in any Man. which has a beneficial Tendency, but is agreeable to my Humanity, however remote the Person: But every Man, so far remov'd as neither to cross nor serve my Avarice and Ambition, is altogether indifferent to those Passions. The Distinction, therefore, betwixt those different Species of Sentiment being so strong and evident, Language must soon be moulded upon it, and must invent a peculiar Set of Terms to express those universal Sentiments of Censure or Approbation, which arise from Humanity or from Views of general Usefulness and its contrary. VIRTUE and VICE become then known: Morals are recogniz'd: Certain general Ideas are fram'd of human Conduct and Behaviour: Such Measures are expected from Men, in such Situations: This Action is determin'd con-formable