Reason judges either of Matter of Fact or of Relations. Enquire then, first, where is that Matter of Fact, which we here call Crime; point it out; determine the Time of its Existence; describe its Essence or Nature; explain the Sense or Faculty, to which it discovers itself. It resides in the Mind of the Person, who is ungrateful. He must, therefore, feel it and be conscious of it. But nothing is there, except the Passion of Ill-will or absolute Indifference. You cannot say, that these, of themselves, always, and in all Circumstances, are Crimes. No: They are only Crimes, when directed towards Persons, who have before exprest and display'd Good-will towards us. Consequently, we may infer, that the Crime of Ingratitude is not any particular individual Fact; but arises from a Complication of Circumstances, which, being presented to the Spectator, excites the Sentiment of Blame, by the particular Structure and Fabric of his Mind.
This Representation, you say, is false. Crime, indeed, consists not in a particular Fact, of whose Reality we are assur'd by Reason: But it consists in certain moral Relations, discoverable by Reason, in the same Manner as we discover, by Reason, the Truths of Geometry or Algebra. But what are the Relations, I ask, of which you here talk? Inthe
