Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/217

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Concerning moral Sentiment.
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No, say you, the Morality consists in the Relation of Action to the Rule of Right; and they are denominated good or ill, according as they agree or disagree with it. What then is this Rule of Right? Wherein does it consist? How is it determin'd? By Reason, you'll say, which examines the moral Relations of Actions. So that moral Relations are determin'd by the Comparison of Actions to a Rule. And the Role is determin'd by considering the moral Relations of Objects. Is not this fine Reasoning?

All this is Metaphysics, you cry. That is enough: There needs nothing more to give a strong Presumption of Falshood. Yes, reply I: Here are Metaphysics surely: But they are all on your Side, who advance an abstruse Hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate to any particular Instance or Illustration. The Hypothesis we embrace is plain. It maintains, that Morality is determin'd by Sentiment. It defines Virtue to be, whatever mental Action or Quality gives to a Spectator the pleasing Sentiment of Approbation; and Vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain Matter of Fact, viz. what Actions have this Influence: We consider all the Circumstances, in which these Actions agree: And from thence endeavour toextract