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APPENDIX II.

like Passions and Reflections in others, the Sentiment of Justice, thro' all Ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some Degree or other, in every Individual of human Species. In so sagacious an Animal, what necessarily arises from the Exertion of his intellectual Faculties, may justly be esteem'd natural[1].

Amongst all civiliz'd Nations, it has been the constant Endeavour to remove every Thing arbitrary and partial from the Decision of Property, and to fix the Sentence of Judges by such general Views and Considerations, as may be equal to every Member of the Society. For besides, that nothing could be more dangerous than to accustom the Bench, even in the smallest Instance, to regard private Friendship or Enmity; 'tis certain, that Men,

  1. Natural may be oppos'd, either to what is unusual, miraculous, or artificial. In the two former Senses, Justice and Property are undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose Reason, Forethought, Design, and a social Union and Confederacy amongst Men, perhaps, that Epithet cannot strictly, in the last Sense, be apply'd to them. Had Men liv'd without Society, Property had never been known, and neither Juice nor Injustice had ever existed. But Society amongst human Creatures, had been impossible, without Reason and Forethought. Inferior Animals, that unite, are guided by Instinct, which supplies the Place of Reason. But all these Disputes are merely verbal.

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