Sentiment. I may lawfully nourish myself from this Tree; but the Fruit of another of the same Species, ten Paces off, 'tis criminal for me to touch. Had I wore this Apparel an Hour ago, I had merited the severest Punishment; but a Man, by pronouncing a few magical Syllables, has now render'd it fit for my Use and Service. Were this House plac'd in the neighbouring Territory, it had been immoral for me to dwell in it; but being built on this Side the River, it is subject to a different municipal Law, and I incur no Blame or Censure. The same Species of Reasoning, it may be thought, which so successfully exposes Superstition, is also applicable to Justice; nor is it possible, in the one Case more than in the other, to point out, in the Object, that precise Quality or Circumstance, which is the Foundation of the Sentiment.
But there is this material Difference betwixt Superstition and Justice, that the former is frivolous, useless, and burthensome; the latter is absolutely requisite to the Well-being of Mankind and Existence of Society. When we abstract from this Circumstance (for 'tis too apparent ever to be overlookt) it must be confest, that all Regards to Right and Property, seem entirely without Foundation, as much as the grossest and most vulgar Superstition. Were the Interests of Society no way concern'd, 'tis as unintelligible, why another's articulating certain Sounds,implying
