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14
No innate Principles in the Mind
Book I.

Children do. It might very well be expected, that these Principles should be perfectly known to Naturals; which being stamped immediately on the Soul (as these Men suppose) can have no dependence on the Constitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Men's Principles, That all the native Beams of Light (were there any such) should in those, who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full Lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Pleasure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst Children, Ideots, Savages, and the grosly illiterate, what general Maxims are to be found? What universal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those Objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their Senses the frequentest and strongest Impression. A Child knows his Nurse and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-things of a little more advanced Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the fashion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect these abstract Maxims, or the Principles of Sciences, will I fear find himself mistaken. Such kind of general Propositions, are seldom mentioned in the Huts of Indians: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of Children, or any Impressions of them on the Minds of Naturals. They are the Discourses of the Schools, and Academies of learned Nations, accustomed to that sort of Conversation, or Learning, where Disputes are frequent: These Maxims being suited to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of Truth, or advancement of Knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of Knowledge, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, l. 4. c. 7.

§. 28. I know not how absurd this may seem to the Masters of Demonstration: And probably, it will hardly down with any Body at first Hearing. I must therefore beg you a little to lay by your prejudice, and suspend your censure, till you have heard me out in the sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better Judgments. And since I impartially search after Truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own Notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warmed our Heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground, to think these two famed speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; Since the assent they so generally find, is no other than what several Propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them; And since the assent is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural Inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if these first Principles of Knowledge and Science, are found not to be innate, no other speculative Maxims can (I suppose) with better Right pretend to be so.

CHAP. III.