thought the Actions of Men the best Interpreters of their thoughts. But since it is certain, that most Men's Practice, and some Men's open Professions, have either questioned or denied these Principles, it is impossible to establish an universal consent (though we should look for it only amongst grown Men) without which, it is impossible to conclude them innate. Secondly, 'Tis very strange and unreasonable, to suppose innate practical Principles, that terminate only in Contemplation. Practical Principles, derived from Nature, are there for Operation, and must produce Conformity of Action, not barely speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain destinguish'd from speculative Maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into Man a desire of Happiness, and an aversion to Misery: These indeed are innate practical Principles, which (as practical Principles ought) do continue constantly, to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceasing: These may be observed in all Persons and all Ages, steady and universal; but these are Inclinations of the Will and Appetite, not Impressions and Characters on the Understanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the Minds of Men; and that, from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for innate Characters on the Mind, which are to be the Principles of Knowledge, regulating our Practice. Such natural Impressions on the Understanding, are so far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an Argument against them; since if there were certain Characters, imprinted by Nature on the Understanding, as the Principles of Knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our Knowledge, as we do those others on the Will and Appetite; which never cease to be the constant Spring and Motives of all our Actions, to which, we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.
§. 4. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical Principles, is, That I think, there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-evident; which every innate Principle must needs be, and not need any Proof to ascertain its Truth, nor want any Reason to gain it Approbation. He would be thought void of common Sense, who asked on the one side, or on the other side went about to give a Reason, Why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other Proof: He that understands the Terms, assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all social Virtue, That one should do as he would be done unto, be propos'd to one, who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; Might he not without any absurdity ask a Reason, why? And were not he that propos'd it, bound to make out the Truth and Reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shews it not to be innate; for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any Proof: but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and understood) be received and assented to, as an unquestionable Truth, which a Man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral Rules, plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced, which could not be, if either they were innate, or so much as self-evident.
§. 5. That
