presumption that it would have detected some falsehood that at present is concealed[1].”
But in requiring similar evidence in the present case, it is said, we transfer the matter from a literary tribunal to another jurisdiction: we are not now in a court of law.—It is true, we are not; but all the principal rules of evidence, as Blackstone’s great prototype, Lord Chief Baron Gilbert, has clearly shewn in his admirable treatise, are founded on right reason, on which ground alone they are adopted; and this first and most general rule is just as applicable to the papers in question, as to any deed or other instrument produced in a court of law.—The great object, however, of this requisition does not seem to be well understood. It is not from any idle curiosity to learn the name of the original owner of these treasures, that the inquiry is made; for it is of very little importance to the world whether he is called Smith, or Johnson; whether he lives in London or Middlesex; whether he is a fair or a black man; a dwarf or six feet high:
