Opinion of the Court
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26). AWF’s licensing of the Orange Prince image thus “ ‘supersede[d] the objects,’ ” Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579, i.e., shared the objectives, of Goldsmith’s photograph, even if the two were not perfect substitutes.[1]
The use also “is of a commercial nature.” §107(1). Just as Goldsmith licensed her photograph to Vanity Fair for $400, AWF licensed Orange Prince to Condé Nast for $10,000. The undisputed commercial character of AWF’s use, though not dispositive, “tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.” Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 562.[2]
- ↑ In this way, the first factor relates to the fourth, market effect. See Campbell, 510 U. S., at 591; cf. also Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 568 (“The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a story about the Nixon pardon—precisely the use petitioners had licensed to Time”). While the first factor considers whether and to what extent an original work and secondary use have substitutable purposes, the fourth factor focuses on actual or potential market substitution. Under both factors, the analysis here might be different if Orange Prince appeared in an art magazine alongside an article about Warhol. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 33.
While keenly grasping the relationship between The Two Lolitas, the dissent fumbles the relationship between the first and fourth fair use factors. Under today’s decision, as before, the first factor does not ask whether a secondary use causes a copyright owner economic harm. Cf. post, at 21 (opinion of Kagan, J.). There is, however, a positive association between the two factors: A secondary use that is more different in purpose and character is less likely to usurp demand for the original work or its derivatives, as the Court has explained, see Campbell, 519 U. S., at 591. This relationship should be fairly obvious. But see post, at 22 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the first factor can favor only the user and the fourth factor only the copyright owner). Still, the relationship is not absolute. For example, copies for classroom use might fulfill demand for an original work. The first factor may still favor the copyist, even if the fourth factor is shown not to. At the same time, other forms of straight copying may be fair if a strong showing on the fourth factor outweighs a weak showing on the first.
- ↑ The dissent misconstrues the role of commercialism in this analysis. The Court does not hold that “[a]ll that matters is that [AWF] and the publisher entered into a licensing transaction”; or that the first-factor
