Thus the Liberal leaders of the Opposition were in full harmony with the foreign policy of the Conservatives, but, due to their failure to understand the danger of Great Britain’s isolation, they urged prompt and decisive action.
On the other hand, the Conservatives, due to the diplomatic foresight and influence of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury, appreciated the danger which Great Britain, without allies, or without assured colonial support, was facing in territorial and commercial expansion in Afriea and in the East; and they were doing their utmost to block any possible union between the two military allianees of the continent. Especially helpful for their purpose were the intense Franeo-German hatred and the friendship of Théophile Delcassé of the French colonial office, 1893–1898, for Great Britain. But for all immediate or practical purposes Great Britain stood isolated, facing the possibility of an attack by each of the two alliances. Should she have been forced into sueh a war under existing conditions, she would have, in all probability, been seriously defeated. It. was this perilous isolation which the Salisbury ministry faced and understood and which the Opposition failed to appreciate—an isolation whose significance was stated openly and frankly on May 13, 1898, by Joseph Chamberlain in an address to his constituency at Birmingham.
This address set forth three fundamental propositions: first, that Great Britain had maintained a policy of strict isolation since the Crimean War, but now a new situation had arisen and she was liable to
