Page:Ante-Nicene Christian Library Vol 2.djvu/307

This page has been validated.
TO THE GREEKS.
293

them concerning it. For Plato says that it is of three parts, having the faculty of reason, of affection, and of appetite.[1] But Aristotle says that the soul is not so comprehensive as to include also corruptible parts, but only reason. And Plato loudly maintains that "the whole soul is immortal." But Aristotle, naming it "the actuality,"[2] would have it to be mortal, not immortal. And the former says it is always in motion; but Aristotle says that it is immoveable, since it must itself precede all motion.


Chap. vii.Inconsistencies of Plato's doctrine.

But in these things they are convicted of thinking in contradiction to each other. And if any one will accurately criticise their writings, they have chosen to abide in harmony not even with their own opinions. Plato, at any rate, at one time says that there are three first principles of the universe—God, and matter, and form; but at another time four, for he adds the universal soul. And again, when he has already said that matter is eternal,[3] he afterwards says that it is produced; and when he has first given to form its peculiar rank as a first principle, and has asserted for it self-subsistence, he afterwards says that this same thing is among the things perceived by the understanding. Moreover, having first declared that everything that is made is mortal,[4] he afterwards states that some of the things that are made are indestructible and immortal. What, then, is the cause why those who have been esteemed wise among you disagree not only with one another, but also with themselves? Manifestly, their unwillingness to learn from those who know, and their desire to attain accurate knowledge of things heavenly by their own human excess of wisdom; though they were able to understand not even earthly matters. Certainly some of your philosophers

  1. τὸ λογικὸν, τὸ θυμικὸν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν,—corresponding to what we roughly speak of as reason, the heart, and the appetites.
  2. ἐντελέχεια,—the completion or actuality to which each thing, by virtue of its peculiar nature (or potentiality, δύναμις), can arrive.
  3. Literally, "unbegotten."
  4. Or, "liable to destruction."