supposition which is absurd; but it also believes in a decoration, which at one time goes with, and at another time stays away from its construction, and which is an event which, equally in either case, is without any reason.[1] And, with this, perhaps we may pass on.
Let us return to that statement of the case which appeared to us more plausible. There is a succession
| A | — | B | — | C. |
| | | | | | | ||
| α | β | γ |
and in this the secondary qualities are inseparable from the primary. A—B—C is, in fact, never found by itself, but it is, for all that, the true and the only causal sequence. We shall, however, find that this way of statement does but hide the same mistake which before was apparent. In the succession above, unless there really is more than we are supposed to take in, and unless α, β, γ are connected with something outside, we have still the old inconsistency. If A—B—C is the truth, then the succession, which we had, is in fact impossible; and, if the sequence is modified, then A—B—C can not possibly be true. I will not urge that, if it were true, it would at least be undiscoverable, since, by the hypothesis, α is inseparable from A. I admit that we may postulate sometimes where we cannot prove or observe; and I prefer to show that such a postulate is here self-contradictory. It is assumed that α is an adjective indivisible from A, but is an adjective which at the same time makes no difference to its being. Or α, at any rate, makes no difference to the action of A, but is perfectly inert. But, if so, then, as before, A possesses two predicates incompatible with each other. We cannot
- ↑ If there were a reason, then mere A would no longer be the cause of both B and Bβ. I shall return to this lower down.
