Jackson cannot be accused of demagogy in this regard, because he shared the prejudice. Then there was good reason for believing that the bank was in some respect mismanaged, and for fearing that a great financial institution, so intimately related to the government, might be made an engine of political corruption. Furthermore, the correspondence between Sec. Ingham and Nicholas Biddle, president of the bank, in the summer of 1829, shows that some of Jackson's friends wished to use the bank for political purposes, and were enraged at Biddle's determination in pursuing an independent course. The occasion was duly improved by the “kitchen cabinet” to fill Jackson's ears with stories tending to show that the influence of the bank was secretly exerted in favor of the opposite party. Jackson's suggestions with reference to the bank in his first message met with little favor, especially as he coupled them with suggestions for the distribution of the surplus revenue among the states. He returned to the attack in his two following messages, until in 1832 the bank felt obliged in self-defence to apply, somewhat prematurely, for a renewal of its charter on the expiration of its term. Charges brought against the bank by Democratic representatives were investigated by a committee, which returned a majority report in favor of the bank. A minority report sustained the charges. After prolonged discussion, the bill to renew the charter passed both houses, and on 10 July, 1832, was vetoed by the president. An attempt to pass the bill over the veto failed of the requisite two-third majority.
Circumstances had already given a flavor of personal contest to Jackson's assaults upon the bank. There was no man whom he hated so fiercely as Clay, who was at the same time his chief political rival. Clay made the mistake of forcing the bank question into the foreground, in the belief that it was an issue upon which he was likely to win in the coming presidential campaign. Clay's movement was an invitation to the people to defeat Jackson in order to save the bank; and this naturally aroused all the combativeness in Jackson's nature. His determined stand impressed upon the popular imagination the picture of a dauntless “tribune of the people” fighting against the “monster monopoly.” Clay unwisely attacked the veto power of the president, and thus gave Benton an opportunity to defend it by analogies drawn from the veto power of the ancient Roman tribune, which in point of fact it does not at all resemble. The discussion helped Jackson more than Clay. It was also a mistake on the part of the Whig leader to risk the permanence of such an institution as the U. S. bank upon the fortunes of a presidential canvass. It dragged the bank into politics in spite of itself, and, by thus affording justification for the fears to which Jackson had appealed, played directly into his hands. In this canvass all the candidates were for the first time nominated in national conventions. There were three conventions — all held at Baltimore. In September, 1831, the Anti-Masons nominated William Wirt, of Virginia, in the hope of getting the national Republicans or Whigs to unite with them; but the latter, in December, nominated Clay. In the following March the Democrats nominated Jackson, with Van Buren for vice-president. During the year 1832 the action of congress and president with regard to the bank charter was virtually a part of the campaign. In the election South Carolina voted for candidates of her own — John Floyd, of Virginia, and Henry Lee, of Massachusetts. There were 219 electoral votes for Jackson, 49 for Clay, 11 for Floyd, and 7 for Wirt. Jackson interpreted this overwhelming victory as a popular condemnation of the bank and approval of all his actions as president. The enthusiastic applause from all quarters which now greeted his rebuke of the nullifiers served still further to strengthen his belief in himself as a “saviour of society” and champion of “the people.” Men were getting into a state of mind in which questions of public policy were no longer argued upon their merits, but all discussion was drowned in cheers for Jackson. Such a state of things was not calculated to check his natural vehemence and disposition to override all obstacles in carrying his point. He now felt it to be his sacred duty to demolish the bank. In his next message to congress he created some alarm by expressing doubts as to the bank's solvency and recommending an investigation to see if the deposits of public money were safe. In some parts of the country there were indications of a run upon the branches of the bank. The committee of ways and means investigated the matter, and reported the bank as safe and sound, but a minority report threw doubt upon these conclusions, so that the public uneasiness was not allayed. The conclusions of the members of the committee, indeed, bore little reference to the evidence before them, and were determined purely by political partisanship. Jackson made up his mind that the deposits must be removed from the bank. The act of 1816, which created that institution, provided that the public funds might be removed from it by order of the secretary of the treasury, who must, however, inform congress of his reasons for the removal. As congress resolved, by heavy majorities, that the deposits were safe in the bank, the spring of 1833 was hardly a time when a secretary of the treasury would feel himself warranted, in accordance with the provisions of the act, to order their removal. Sec. McLane was accordingly unwilling to issue such an order. In what followed, Jackson had the zealous co-operation of Kendall and Blair. In May, McLane was transferred to the state department, and was succeeded in the treasury by William J. Duane, of Pennsylvania. The new secretary, however, was convinced that the removal was neither necessary nor wise, and, in spite of the president's utmost efforts, refused either to issue the order or to resign his office. In September, accordingly, Duane was removed, and Roger B. Taney was appointed in his place. Taney at once ordered that after the 1st of October the public revenues should no longer be deposited with the national bank, but with sundry state banks, which soon came to be known as the “pet banks.” Jackson alleged, as one chief reason for this proceeding, that, if the bank were to continue to receive public revenues on deposit, it would unscrupulously use them in buying up all the members of congress and thus securing an indefinite renewal of its charter. This, he thought, would be a death-blow to free government in America. His action caused intense excitement and some commercial distress, and prepared the way for further disturbance. In the next session of the senate Clay introduced a resolution of censure, which was carried after a debate which lasted all winter. It contained a declaration that the president had assumed “authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.” Jackson protested against the resolution, but the senate refused to receive his protest. Many of his appointments were rejected by the senate, especially those of the directors of the bank, and of Taney as secretary of
