of military operations in the armies of the Confed-
eracy." The campaign of the preceding year in Vir-
ginia had embraced but one battle of importance,
that of Bull Run or Manassas, and the Confederate
success there had not been followed by anything
more active than an advance to Centreville and
Fairfax Court-House, with advanced posts on Ma-
son's and Munson's hills. Meantime McClellan
had been engaged in reorganizing the National
army, and converting the raw levies into disci-
plined troops. When he was finally ready to ad-
vance, the Confederates retired to the south side of
the Rappahannock, and when McClellan trans-
ferred his base to Fort Monroe and advanced upon
Richmond by way of the peninsula, Gen. Joseph
E. Johnston removed his army to Williamsburg,
leaving Jackson's division in the valley and E well's
on the line of the Rappahannock. Johnston fell
back in May to make his stand in defence of Richmond immediately in front of the town. McClellan advanced to a line near the city with his army of more than 100,000 men, and, under the
mistaken impression that Johnston's force out-
numbered his own, waited for McDowell, who was
advancing with 40,000 men from the neighborhood
of Fredericksburg to join him. To prevent the
coming of this re-enforcement, Lee ordered Ewell
to join Jackson, and directed the latter to attack
Ranks in the valley of the Shenandoah, drive him
across the Potomac, and thus seem to threaten
Washington city. Jackson executed the task as-
signed him with such celerity and success as to
cause serious apprehension in Washington. Mc-
Dowell was recalled, and the re-enforcement of
McClellan was prevented. The latter now estab-
lished himself on the Chickahominy, with a part
of his army thrown across that stream. A flood
came at the end of May, and, believing that the
swollen river effectually isolated this force, Gen.
Johnston attacked it on 31 May, hoping to crush
it before assistance could reach it from the northern side of the river. Thus resulted the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, in which Johnston was seriously wounded and rendered unfit for further service for a time. McClellan fortified his lines, his left wing lying near White Oak Swamp, on the south of the Chickahominy, his right extending up the river to Mechanicsville, and his depot being at the White House on the York river railroad and
the Pamunkey river.
Now, for the first time, Gen. Lee had direct command of a great army confronting an enemy strongly posted, and his capacity as a strategist and commander was first demonstrated in that bloody and brilliant, but only in part successful, series of manoeuvres and contests known as "the seven days' battle." He determined to adopt that offensive defence which was always his favorite method. Instead of awaiting MeClellan's attack, he resolved to defend Richmond by dislodging the foe that threatened it. His plan was secretly to bring Jackson's force to his aid, and, while holding McClellan in check on the south side of the river with a part of his force securely in- trenched, to transfer the rest of it to the north side, turn the enemy's flank, and move down the river in his rear, threatening his communications and compelling him to quit his intrenchments for a battle in the open, or to abandon his position altogether and retreat. The first necessity was to fortify the lines south of the river.and when that was done, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with a cavalry column, was sent to march around MeClellan's position, ascertain the condition of the roads in his rear, and gather such other information as was needed. Jackson, with his entire force, was brought to Ashland, on the Fredericksburg railroad, from which point he was to move on 25 June to the neighborhood of Atlee's Station, and turn the enemy's positions at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam on the next day. A. P. Hill's division was to cross the river at Meadow Bridge as soon as Jackson's move- ment should uncover it, and Longstreet and D. II. Hill were to cross in their turn when the passage should be clear. There was a delay of one day in Jackson's movement, however, so that he did not turn the position at Beaver Dam until the 2?th. A. P. Hill, after waiting until the afternoon of the 26th for the movement of Jackson to accomplish the intended purpose, pushed across the river at Meadow Bridge and drove out the force that occupied Mechanicsville. Longstreet and D. H. Hill also crossed, and the next morning the works at Beaver Dam were turned and the Confederates pushed forward in their march down the river, Jackson in advance with D. H. Hill for support, while Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and upon the right, to attack McClellan in flank and rear, should lie seriously oppose Jackson's advance toward the York river railroad. There was some miscarriage of plans, due to a mistake in Jackson's movement, and, in consequence, Long- street and Hill encountered the right wing of MeClellan's force in a strong position near Gaines's Mills before the advance under Jackson was en- gaged at all. The resistance of the National troops was stubborn, and it was not until after Jackson came up and joined in the conflict that the position was forced. The National troops suffered severely, and were finally driven across the river. Lee now commanded MeClellan's communications, and no course was open to the National general but to save his army by a retreat to the James river, during which severe battles were fought at Savage's Station and Frazier's Farm. The series of manoeuvres and battles ended in a fierce conflict at Malvern Hill, where the Confederates suffered terribly in a series of partial and ill-directed assaults upon a strong position taken by the retreating foe. The bloody repulses thus inflicted consoled the retreating army somewhat for their disaster, but could not repair the loss of position already suffered or do more than delay the retreat. The operations outlined above had brought MeClellan's movement against Richmond to naught, and their moral effect was very great; but Lee was convinced that he had had and lost an opportunity to compel the actual surrender of his enemy, though stronger than himself in numbers, and regarded MeClellan's escape upon any terms as a partial failure of his plans, due to accidental miscarriages. (For a further account of this campaign, see McClellan, George Brinton.) Having driven McClellan from his position in front of Richmond, and having thus raised what was in effect the siege of that city, Gen. Lee's desire was to transfer the scene of operations to a distance from the Confederate capital, and thus relieve the depression of the southern people which had followed the general falling back of their armies and the disasters sustained in the west. McClellan lay at Harrison's Landing, below Richmond, with an army that was still strong, and while the Confederate capital was no longer in immediate danger, the withdrawal of the army defending it would invite attack and capture unless MeClellan's withdrawal at the same time could be forced. For effecting that, Lee calculated upon the apparently excessive concern felt at the north for the safety of Washington. If he could so dis-
