and the militia, to cover the country and the public stores. Clinton attacked Greene at Springfield on 23 June, 1780; but Greene held him at bay at the Rahway bridges, and, gradually contracting his front, which had been lengthened to cover the mountain-passes, secured a strong position back of the town, and there awaited another attack. Clinton's forces, after setting fire to the town, retreated, and did not halt until they had reached Staten Island. Greene and his officers were thanked in general orders. On 17 Sept., Washington set out for Hartford, for a conference with Rochambeau, leaving Greene in command of the army. The Americans moved forward to Tappan on the 19th, and late in the evening of the 25th Greene was apprised, in a few hurried lines from Hamilton, of Arnold's treason. The captive André arrived at Tappan under close guard on 28 Sept., and the following day a board of inquiry, with Greene as president, was convened for his trial. With tears Greene signed the decree of the court condemning the young officer to death. Clinton despatched three commissioners to argue André's case, and Greene was sent by Washington to confer with them; but their efforts were unavailing. It has been asserted, but not confirmed, that Greene cast a deciding vote in the council against granting André's prayer to be shot instead of hanged. He held that André, if punished at all, should receive the punishment meted to spies according to the laws of war. In August, 1780, Gen. Greene, annoyed by the inefficiency of congress in providing supplies, and rightly suspecting an intention on its part of interfering with him in the discharge of his duties as quartermaster-general, resigned that office. Washington's enemies in congress chose to consider this action as a mark of disrespect for that body, and attempted unsuccessfully to drive him from the army. The post at West Point, left vacant by Arnold's treason, was confided to Greene, who assumed the command on 8 Oct., 1780. Gates's failure in the southern campaign compelled his recall in August, and by common consent Greene was looked upon as the fittest man to retrieve the fortunes of the southern army. Washington, empowered by congress, wrote on 14 Oct., asking Greene to take Gates's late command. The task he found before him on taking command at Charlotte, 2 Dec., 1780, was formidable enough to daunt the boldest spirit. In front of him was an army of 3,224 men, abundantly clothed and fed, well disciplined, elated with victory, and led by an able general. To oppose this force, he had an army of 2,307 men, of whom 1,482 were present and fit for duty, 547 were absent on command, and 128 were detached on extra service, half fed, scantily clothed, cast down by defeat, and many of them defiant of all discipline. Furthermore, the country was infested with Tories. Recognizing the impossibility of facing Cornwallis with such inferior numbers, Greene resolved to divide his forces, by which means he might not only secure an abundant supply of food, but could keep the enemy within narrower bounds, cut them off from the supplies of the upper country, revive the drooping spirits of the inhabitants, threaten the posts and communications of the enemy, and compel him to suspend his threatened invasion of North Carolina. Morgan was detached with the famous Maryland brigade, and Col. Washington's regiment of light dragoons, to take up a position near the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad rivers, in the hope of threatening his adversary's left flank. With the other division, Greene, after a laborious march through a barren country, took post at Hick's creek on the Pedee, near the South Carolina line. Tarleton, who was hastening forward from the main army, meditating a decisive blow at his despised opponents, attacked Morgan at the Cowpens, on 17 Jan., 1781, and, after a hard-fought battle, was utterly routed, losing over 300 men killed and wounded, with about 500 prisoners, out of a total force of 1,100. Cornwallis was infuriated by this disaster, and, ridding himself of his heavy luggage and whatever might impede his progress, at once set out in active pursuit of Morgan. In a most brilliant march Greene effected a junction of the two divisions of his army at Guilford Court-House on 9 Feb., 1781. He had expected here to meet re-enforcements from Virginia, but, as they had not yet arrived, he thought it best to retreat toward them and put the broad stream of the Dan between himself and the enemy. By practising every expedient his fertile mind could devise, he succeeded in getting across the river, without loss of men, baggage, or stores. Cornwallis, who had been close upon his heels for more than 200 miles, finding his troops fatigued and dispirited by their fruitless march, prudently retired to Hillsborough. Presently Greene received his re-enforcement, and thereupon, crossing the Dan, came to battle with Cornwallis at Guilford Court-House, 15 March. Although this battle was a tactical success for the British, the Americans nevertheless gained a decisive strategic advantage, for the enemy, being too much shattered to continue the contest, retired to Wilmington, from which point he moved into Virginia to effect a junction with the forces of Gen. Phillips. Greene immediately turned his face southward, leaving Cornwallis to proceed unmolested into Virginia. Greene's reasons for this move were given to Washington in a letter on 29 March, as follows: “I am determined to carry the war immediately into South Carolina. The enemy will be obliged to follow us, or give up the posts in that state.” If the former took place, it would take the war out of the devastated state of North Carolina, and give the inhabitants time to recuperate; and, in the event of leaving the posts in South Carolina to fall, the enemy would lose far more than they could gain in Virginia.
The most important strategic post in South Carolina was Camden, which stood at the intersection of the principal roads leading to the north and west with those leading down to the seaboard. On 20 April the American army established itself in a strong position at Hobkirk's Hill, near Camden, and on the 25th it was assaulted there by the British under Lord Rawdon. This was exactly the move for which Greene had been preparing. The assault ought to have resulted in the total ruin of the British army; but, through an accidental misunderstanding of orders, Greene's very best men in the Maryland brigade behaved badly, and he was forced to abandon his position. The defeat, however, did not prevent his reaping, as he invariably did, all the fruits of victory. He had already sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thereby cut Rawdon's communications with the coast. This operation, admirably planned and brilliantly successful, obliged Rawdon to abandon Camden and fall back toward Charleston, and from this time Greene had the game entirely in his own hands. During May and June he reconquered all the back country of South Carolina and Georgia, capturing Fort Motte, Fort Granby, Orangeburg, and Augusta, with all their garrisons. After a sanguinary siege of twenty-eight days, he forced the British to evacuate Fort Ninety-Six, and thus give up their
last hold upon the interior.
