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ARISTOTLE ON THE VITAL PRINCIPLE.
[BK. II.

very dry or very moist, is not sensible of sapid impressions—as in the former instance, it is a tangible rather than a sapid impression which is made by a fluid when first tasted; and when very moist, it is sensible only of the fluid already present, just as it happens when, after tasting something pungent, we proceed to taste a different fluid. It is thus that all savours appear to the sick to be bitter, because the tongue, with which they taste, is charged with a moisture having that savour.

Kinds of savour are, like shades of colour, simple when in broad contrast—as the sweet and bitter with their sequences, of the former the oily and of the latter the brackish; and intermediate to these are the pungent, rough, astringent, and sour, which seem to include almost all the varieties of savour.

In fine, the sapid sense, when in potentiality, is such as is the sapid object; and the sapid object, when in reality, is productive, in the sense, of its own savour.