cleared up to my satisfaction in all essential points. It deals with two subjects, the independent discretion vested in the Governors (Râjâkas), and the reprieve of three days granted to convicts lying under sentence of death.
As to the Râjûkas, I believe that the word is etymologically connected with Râja, and that Bühler's notion of its relation to rajiu, a measuring rope, was mistaken. Considering the extent of those officers’ powers over hundreds of thousands of subjects, and the unfettered discretion allowed to them, the rendering 'Governors' is preferable to 'Commissioners.' I understand that the rank of Râjûka had long existed, and that Asoka's innovation consisted in granting them extensive powers without the necessity of obtaining sanction for particular acts by reference to the Crown. The designation Râjûka does not occur in the Arthaśâsta.
The imperfectly understood term 'Agents' (pulisâ) recurs here. We cannot at present define the exact position of those olfficers.
'Confidently, and quietly,’ Michelson's rendering, is, I think, right.
'Uniformity,' samatâ, as Senart, not 'equity,' as Bühler 'Judicial procedure,' viyohâla, is indicated by the context as the correct translation here. Bühler preferred the more general words 'official business,' and is supported by Kalinga Provincials' Edict, where viyohâlika seems to mean 'administrators' rather than 'judges,' although the latter rendering is not excluded.
In interpreting the last two paragraphs I have been helped by the remarks of Thomas in J. R. A. S., 1916, pp. 120-3. I venture to think that my version gives the real meaning. If a revision should be granted, the convicts would save their lives. If it should be refused, both they and their relations would at any rate gain spiritual advantages. I take it that the Râjûkas were empowered and required to grant invariably the three days' delay before execution. That interpretation connects the two subjects discussed in the document.
