Page:At the Eleventh Hour by T. G. Masaryk (1916).pdf/19

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(2) Austria was defeated by the Russians, and by the Serbians. But the defeat restored Austria to life, the danger augmented her forces. And then Germany came to Austria’s aid—the Austrian army was, and is now, directed by the Germans. The German system has been imposed upon its administration, and experience shows that it is effective and works well. We have here a very instructive instance not only of Germany’s efficiency, but also of the fact that in war, leadership and the chief command is the deciding factor. If an army of good soldiers fails, it is from the head that the fish stinks (to quote a drastic German proverb). The war has proved that the soldiers of all the belligerent countries are excellent, each nation having some individual, specific qualities.

The German leading of the Austrian army paralyses the pro-Allies sympathies of a considerable part of the Austro-Hungarian army. The war against Serbia and Russia was very popular with the Germans and Magyars; of the other nations the Poles and Ruthenes (excepting the Russophile minority) were warlike in feeling, while the remaining nations were against the war. Of these the Bohemian regiments in particular showed their Slavophil sympathies without reserve, as is generally known; nor did the Serbocroats, the Roumanians and Italians like fighting for Austria: Later on, when Italy went against Austria, the Slav troops were sent against Italy, whose claims on Dalmatia wounded the national feelings of the Serbocroats, Slovenes and Czechs.

(3) There is one difference between Austria and Germany, which, although already mentioned, I wish to repeat and emphasize: In the first phase of the war Austria did not send to the front so many troops as Germany and, therefore, Austria now has relatively greater reserves of men. Furthermore, Austria’s industry needs less men, and this again will allow her to put comparatively more men into the Army. The men have already been called out.

13.—The British Army.

I am writing these lines in a critical moment: Parliament and the Press are getting more and more restless, the policy of the Government, the Army and its leading is being criticised on all sides. I follow very closely all public utterances and try to learn what sensible people of all classes think, and say. The war lasts long, and the Allies now after the retreat of the Russians are not gaining ground (since the battle of the Marne, that is to say, for over a year!) and as it is generally known—and just this point is emphasized, not only by the official press in Russia, France and England—that the Allies dispose of a greater amount of troops, the disquieting question arises, what is the cause of the deadlock and of the reverses, if the shortcomings in the supply of ammunition have really been removed? I am anxious to discriminate between inconsiderate and unfounded criticism and a conscientious if reluctant expression of “holy dissatisfaction,” as this state of mind under analogous circumstances has been called. The situation is very serious indeed, it cannot be more serious.

I will try to do full justice to the Allies, I will not allow myself to be carried away by the feeling of dissatisfaction, which close observation evokes.

Britain never having been a military state, had no big Army, or rather, British militarism displayed itself in the Navy. From some official hints it is manifest, that Britain joined the Allies on the understanding that she would send only a small army, but would make full use of her Navy and help financially. Unquestionably the British Navy deserves full praise; equal praise must be bestowed upon the financial help, given not only by the State, but by private relief work as well.