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transport of the troops to Europe, even to the Turkish theatre of war, would be very expensive. But may not a postponement of the decision prove even more expensive? Perhaps it would be advisable from the political standpoint to bring Japan into a stronger opposition against Germany. In the second place, the Japanese themselves maintain that they cannot accept money payment from the Allies. But the latter would only have to advance to Japan the necessary sum, which would then be repaid out of the future German indemnity. To-day the United States would not interfere with any action of Japan against Germany. However much they may dislike the Japanese, they would certainly prefer Japanese intervention to a German victory.
24.—Necessity of a Political as well as a Strategical Plan.
King Constantine says in the interview granted to the correspondent of The Times: “We are desirous of knowing the programme which the Allies have drawn up for themselves.” This desire is shared by many people and, it seems, even by the Allies themselves.
In speaking of the plan of the Allies, it is not superfluous to accentuate two things. First, that the strategical plan must be distinguished from the political plan; but it is a matter of course that strategy prepares the political settlement, and the whole war must be subservient to the political aims of the warring States. On the other hand the political plan influences the strategy, as has been pointed out already.
The second observation refers to Britain. In the English papers and public opinion it is very apparent that the administrative plan of raising an army is mistaken for the strategical plan. In Germany or France this part of the whole task is looked upon as a mere matter of military administration in England the public pays much greater attention to this work. The difference is very striking. In France, General Joffre, the strategical leader, is put in the foreground and is considered first; while in England, Lord Kitchener’s great authority is bound up with military administration, and it is not easy to see who are the supreme strategical leaders of the army. There is no military leader of Joffre’s repute. How this affects the army, either men or officers, I have no means of judging, but it is at least suggestive. It is very strange that Lord Kitchener should have had to inspect the East, and to perform the work of a diplomatist. Joffre’s visit to London, on the contrary, dealt with matters of strategy. In any case Lord Kitchener’s absence points to some vagueness in the supreme war authority.
25.—The German Political Programme: Pan-German Central Europe or “Berlin—Baghdad.”
There is a tendency at the present moment to ascribe to the Balkans a high strategical importance, and to imagine that a new epoch of the war is being inaugurated. I do not think so. The theatre of the war has been widened; but from the very beginning it was the Near and the Far East which was aimed at by Germany’s outspoken and well prepared plan, which was and is: Berlin–Baghdad.
It is rather curious that this plan should become manifest only now, when Germany is reaching Constantinople. And even to-day the German plan is not fully understood. Yet German politicians, historians and economists have for many years past worked out the plan “Berlin–Baghdad.” If French, English and Russian publicists and politicians neglected this plan as an Utopia, they were greatly mistaken. To-day we see, that the German armies have already to a large extent realised the plan.
