afterwards Ráígarh, due east of Jinjara, and devoted himself to the consolidation of his dominion. His army was admirably organized and officered, and the men were highly paid, not by feudal chiefs, but by the government, while all treasure trove in their raids had to be surrendered to the State. His civil officials were educated Bráhmans, since the Maráthás were illiterate. Economy in the army and government, and justice and honesty in the local administration, characterized the strict and able rule of this remarkable man.
Aurangzíb's brief attempt at conciliation – if indeed it were such – was soon exchanged for open hostility. He had, perhaps, employed Jaswant Singh in the hope of again luring Sivají into his power; in any case the plot had failed. Henceforth he recognized the deadly enemy he had made by his impolitic hauteur at Delhi. The Maráthá, for his part, was nothing loth to resume his old depredations. He recovered most of his old forts, sacked Súrat a second time in 1671, sent his nimble horsemen on raids into Khándésh, even defeated a Mughal army in the open field, brought all the southern Konkan – except the ports and territory held by the English, Portuguese, and Abyssinians – under his sway, and began to levy the famous Maráthá chauth or blackmail, amounting to one-fourth of the revenue of each place, as the price of immunity from brigandage. He even carried his ravages as far north as Baróch, where the Maráthás set an ominous precedent by crossing the Narbadá
