Page:Aurangzíb and the Decay of the Mughal Empire.djvu/181

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THE FALL OF GOLKONDA
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begged the Emperor to appoint some one else to carry on the unpleasant business[1]. Later on a proclamation was issued that no Hindú should ride in a palankin or mount an Arab horse without special permission. The inevitable result of these impolitic measures was to throw the whole Hindú population into the arms of their friends the Maráthás, who indeed exacted a heavy blackmail, but made no invidious distinction of creed in their rough and ready system of taxation. Aurangzíb's plan seems to have been, first, to cut off the sources of the Maráthá revenue, by exterminating the kingdoms of Golkonda and Bíjápúr, which paid tribute to the brigands; and then to ferret the 'mountain rats' out of their holes. He clearly thought that the two kingdoms formed his real point of attack, and that after their fall it would be easy to deal with the Maráthás. Evidently he did not know his men.

The first part of his programme was the less difficult to carry out. The old Deccan kingdoms were in no condition to offer serious resistance to Aurangzíb's Grand Army. They might have been annexed long before, but for the selfish indolence of the Mughal generals. The truth is, as Bernier[2] shrewdly remarks, that these commanders enjoyed their almost royal dignity so much, while at the head of large armies

  1. Kháfí Khán, l.c., vol. vii. pp. 310, 311.
  2. Bernier was at Golkonda in 1667, and has left on record a singular penetrating survey of the political condition of the Deccan kingdoms and their relations with the Mughals (Travels, pp. 191-198).