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to the original version of s 67 of the Australian Consumer Law: "This Act applies to and in relation to a contract only if the law of the State is the proper law of the contract". The Australian Consumer Law, Division 1 of Part 3-2 (Chapter 3), like the legislation considered in Freehold Land Investments Ltd v Queensland Estates Pty Ltd [1970] HCA 31; (1970) 123 CLR 418, is an example where, as Walsh J (with whom Barwick CJ agreed) said (at 440) "the Act does not contain any express statement by which its general words are confined by some territorial limitation".
94 In Taylor v Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9; (2014) 253 CLR 531, French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ said that "it should not be accepted that purposive construction may never allow of reading a provision as if it contained additional words (or omitted words) with the effect of expanding its field of operation" (548 [37]). But their Honours continued (548 [38], footnotes omitted)
The question whether the court is justified in reading a statutory provision as if it contained additional words or omitted words involves a judgment of matters of degree. That judgment is readily answered in favour of addition or omission in the case of simple, grammatical, drafting errors which if uncorrected would defeat the object of the provision. It is answered against a construction that fills "gaps disclosed in legislation" or makes an insertion which is "too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact used by the legislature".
95 One decision to which their Honours referred was Marshall v Watson [1972] HCA 27; (1972) 124 CLR 640. In that case, s 42 of the Mental Health Act 1959 (Vic) contained express powers for the admission of a person to a psychiatric hospital including on the recommendation of a medical practitioner. But this did not impliedly permit the police officer to move the plaintiff under compulsion to a psychiatric hospital. Justice Stephen (with whom Menzies J agreed) said (at 649):
Granted that there may seem to be lacking in the legislation powers which it might be thought the Legislature would have done well to include, it is no power of the judicial function to fill gaps disclosed in legislation…
96 The joint judgment in Taylor referred to the three matters identified by Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones [1980] AC 74, 105–106 (as reformulated in Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586, 592 (Lord Nicholls). Those matters may be more in the nature of guidelines, which might not be sufficient even if they are established ([39]–[40]). Specifically:
(1) the court must be able to identify the precise purpose of the provision(s) in question;
