BREYER, J., dissenting
did not intend to produce irrational or undesirable practical consequences. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. 519, 538, 544−545 (2013) (concluding that Congress did not intend an interpretation of the copyright statute that would produce serious and extensive “practical problems”); cf. Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, ante, at ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 8) (“[A] good interpreter also reads a text charitably, not lightly ascribing irrationality to its author”).
II
The reasons set forth above provide sufficient grounds to believe that Congress only intended to require notice and comment for substantive rules. The Court nonetheless concludes that three “textual clues” foreclose this interpretation. Ante, at 10−11. I have already mentioned one of them: Congress’ use of the words “statement of policy” in the provision before us. As I have explained, the most plausible explanation for this language is that Congress sought to make clear that the agency must use notice and comment for any agency pronouncement that amounts to a substantive rule—irrespective of the label that the agency applies. See supra, at 8−9.
The remaining two arguments that the Court offers to defend its interpretation are, in my view, similarly inadequate. The Court points, for example, to §1395hh(e)(1), which Congress added in 2003. See §903(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2376. That subsection limits the agency’s authority to make retroactive any “substantive change” in “regulations, manual instructions, interpretative rules, statements of policy, or guidelines of general applicability.” The Court points out that the word “substantive” in this subsection does not mean a “substantive rule” under the APA. Ante, at 8−9. And I agree with that observation. But I cannot see how that fact sheds light on the meaning of the phrase “establishes or changes a substantive legal standard,”
