Syllabus
BAKER BOTTS L. L. P. ET AL. v. ASARCO LLC
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 14–103. Argued February 25, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015
Respondent ASARCO LLC hired petitioner law firms pursuant to §327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to assist it in carrying out its duties as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession. See 11 U. S. C. §327(a). When ASARCO emerged from bankruptcy, the law firms fled fee applications requesting fees under § 330(a)(1), which permits bankruptcy courts to “award … reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” §327(a) professionals. ASARCO challenged the applications, but the Bankruptcy Court rejected ASARCO’s objections and awarded the law firms fees for time spent defending the applications. ASARCO appealed to the District Court, which held that the law firms could be awarded fees for defending their fee applications. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that §330(a)(1) did not authorize fee awards for defending fee applications.
Held: Section 330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award fees to §327(a) professionals for defending fee applications. Pp. 126–135.
(a) The American Rule provides the “ ‘basic point of reference’ ” for awards of attorney’s fees: “ ‘Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.’ ” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–253. Because the rule is deeply rooted in the common law, see, e. g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306, this Court will not deviate from it “ ‘absent explicit statutory authority,’ ” Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 602. Departures from the American Rule have been recognized only in “specific and explicit provisions,” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 260, usually containing language that authorizes the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” “fees,” or “litigation costs,” and referring to a “prevailing party” in the context of an adversarial “action,” see generally Hardt, supra, at 253, and nn. 3–7. Pp. 126–127.