Breyer, J., dissenting
“roving authority … to allow counsel fees … whenever [we] might deem them warranted.” Alyeska Pipeline, supra, at 260. Our job is to follow the text even if doing so will supposedly “undercut a basic objective of the statute,” post, at 137. Section 330(a)(1) itself does not authorize the award of fees for defending a fee application, and that is the end of the matter.
***
As we long ago observed, “The general practice of the United States is in opposition” to forcing one side to pay the other’s attorney’s fees, and “even if that practice [is] not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.” Arcambel, 3 Dall., at 306 (emphasis deleted). We follow that approach today. Because §330(a)(1) does not explicitly override the American Rule with respect to fee-defense litigation, it does not permit bankruptcy courts to award compensation for such litigation. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
As the Court’s opinion explains, there is no textual, contextual, or other support for reading 11 U. S. C. §330(a)(1) in the way advocated by petitioners and the United States. Given the clarity of the statutory language, it would be improper to allow policy considerations to undermine the American Rule in this case. On that understanding, I join all but Part III–B–2 of the Court’s opinion.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” various “professional person[s],” including “attorneys,” whom a bankruptcy “trustee [has] employ[ed] … to
