Opinion of the Court
found that David had knowingly concealed the house’s defects from Buckley. And the court imputed David’s fraudulent intent to Kate because the two had formed a legal partnership to execute the renovation and resale project.
The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel agreed as to David’s fraudulent intent but disagreed as to Kate’s. As the panel saw it, §523(a)(2)(A) barred her from discharging the debt only if she knew or had reason to know of David’s fraud. It instructed the Bankruptcy Court to apply that standard on remand, and, after a second bench trial, the court concluded that Kate lacked the requisite knowledge of David’s fraud and could therefore discharge her liability to Buckley. This time, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the judgment.
The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. In re Bartenwerfer, 860 Fed. Appx. 544 (2021). Invoking our decision in Strang v. Bradner, 114 U. S. 555 (1885), it held that a debtor who is liable for her partner’s fraud cannot discharge that debt in bankruptcy, regardless of her own culpability. 860 Fed. Appx., at 546. Kate thus remained on the hook for her debt to Buckley. Id., at 546–547. We granted certiorari to resolve confusion in the lower courts on the meaning of §523(a)(2)(A).[1] 596 U. S. ___ (2022).
II
A
“[W]e start where we always do: with the text of the statute.” Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 5). Section 523(a)(2)(A) states:
- ↑ See, e.g., In re M.M. Winkler & Assoc., 239 F. 3d 746, 749 (CA5 2001) (debts that arise from fraud cannot be discharged); In re Ledford, 970 F. 2d 1556, 1561 (CA6 1992) (no discharge if the debtor benefited from the fraud); Sullivan v. Glenn, 782 F. 3d 378, 381 (CA7 2015) (a debt is nondischargeable only if the debtor knew or should have known of the fraud); In re Walker, 726 F. 2d 452, 454 (CA8 1984) (same); In re Villa, 261 F. 3d 1148, 1151 (CA11 2001) (a debt cannot be discharged when fraud is imputed to the debtor under agency principles).
