Page:Bergson - Matter and Memory (1911).djvu/281

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
CHAP. IV
PERCEPTION AND MATTER
259

such a question is to admit that the discontinuity established by common sense between objects independent of each other, having each its individuality, comparable to kinds of persons, is a valid distinction. For, on the contrary hypothesis, the question would no longer be how are produced in given parts of matter changes of position, but how is effected in the whole a change of aspect,—a change of which we should then have to ascertain the nature. Let us then formulate at once our third proposition:—

III. All division of matter into independent bodies with absolutely determined outlines is an artificial division.

A body, that is, an independent material object, presents itself at first to us as a system of qualitiesThe division of matters into distinct bodies is no datum of immediate intuition, nor yet a demand of science, if we consider science in its remotest aspirations. in which resistance and colour—the data of sight and touch—occupy the centre, all the rest being, as it were, suspended from them. On the other hand, the data of sight and touch are those which most obviously have extension in space, and the essential character of space is continuity. There are intervals of silence between sounds, for the sense of hearing is not always occupied; between odours, between tastes, there are gaps, as though the senses of smell and taste only functioned accidentally: as soon as we open our eyes, on the contrary, the whole field of vision takes on colour; and, since solids are necessarily in contact with each other, our touch must follow