Opinion of the Court
Id., at 376–377. Amtrak argued that it was not subject to the First Amendment because it was a corporation separate from the Federal Government. See id., at 392. Congress had even specified in its authorizing statute that Amtrak was not “an agency or establishment of the United States Government.” Id., at 391 (quoting 84 Stat. 1330). Despite this disclaimer, we held that Amtrak remained subject to the First Amendment because it functioned as an instrumentality of the Federal Government, “created by a special statute, explicitly for the furtherance of federal governmental goals” of ensuring that the American public had access to passenger trains. Lebron, 513 U. S., at 397. Its board was appointed by the President, and it had to submit annual reports to the President and Congress. Id., at 385–386. Having been “established and organized under federal law for the very purpose of pursuing federal governmental objectives, under the direction and control of federal governmental appointees,” Amtrak could not disclaim that it was “part of the Government.” Id., at 398, 400.
We reiterated the point in Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, 575 U. S. 43 (2015). There, railroads argued that giving Amtrak regulatory power was an unconstitutional delegation of government authority to a private entity. Id., at 49–50. We rejected that contention, noting that “Amtrak was created by the Government, is controlled by the Government, and operates for the Government’s benefit.” Id., at 53. It was therefore acting “as a governmental entity” in exercising that regulatory power. Id., at 54.
That principle holds true here. The Secretary and the dissent contend that because MOHELA can sue on its own behalf, it—not Missouri—must be the one to sue. But in Arkansas, 346 U. S. 368, the University of Arkansas could have asserted its rights under the contract on its own. The University’s governing statute made it “a body politic and corporate,” with “all the powers of a corporate body,” Ark.
