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BIDEN v. NEBRASKA

Barrett, J., concurring

Congress to legislate on “important subjects” while delegating away only “the details.” Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825). That is different from a normative rule that discourages Congress from empowering agencies. To see what I mean, return to the ambitious babysitter. Our expectation of clearer authorization for the amusement-park trip is not about discouraging the parent from giving significant leeway to the babysitter or forcing the parent to think hard before doing so. Instead, it reflects the intuition that the parent is in charge and sets the terms for the babysitter—so if a judgment is significant, we expect the parent to make it. If, by contrast, one parent left the children with the other parent for the weekend, we would view the same trip differently because the parents share authority over the children. In short, the balance of power between those in a relationship inevitably frames our understanding of their communications. And when it comes to the Nation’s policy, the Constitution gives Congress the reins—a point of context that no reasonable interpreter could ignore.

Given these baseline assumptions, an interpreter should “typically greet” an agency’s claim to “extravagant statutory power” with at least some “measure of skepticism.” Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324. That skepticism is neither “made-up” nor “new.” Post, at 24, 29 (Kagan, J., dissenting). On the contrary, it appears in a line of decisions spanning at least 40 years. E.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485–486 (2015); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 267–268 (2006); Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160; Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion).[1]

Still, this skepticism does not mean that courts have an


  1. Indeed, the doctrine may have even deeper roots. See ICC v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 494–495 (1897) (explaining that for agency assertions of “vast and comprehensive” power, “no just rule of construction would tolerate a grant of such power by mere implication”).