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BENERTH
128
BERCARIUS

BENERTH. A feudal service rendered by the tenant to his laid with plow and cart. Cowell.

BENEVOLENCE. The doing a kind or helpful action towards another, under no obligation except an ethical one.

Is no doubt distinguishable from the words "liberality" and "charity" for, although many charitable institutions are very properly called "benevolent," it is impossible to say that every object of a man's benevolence is also an object of his charity. James v. Allen, 3 Mer. 17; Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. 1. 4-13: Murdock v. Bridges, 91 Mc. 124, 39 Atl. 475.

In public law. Nominally a voluntary gratuity given by subjects to their king, but in reality a tax or forced loan.

BENEVOLENT. Philanthropic; humane: having a desire or purpose to do good to men; intended for the conferring of benefits, rather than for gain or profit.

This word is certainly more far wider range than "charitable" or "religious:" it would include all gifts prompted by good-will or kind feeling towards the recipient, whether an object of charity or not. The natural and usual meaning of the word would so extend it. It has no legal meaning separate from its usual meaning, "Charitable" has acquired a settled limited meaning in law, which confines it within known limits. But in all the decisions in England on the subject it has been held that s devise or bequest for benevolent objects, or in trust to give to such objects, is too indefinite, and therefore void. Morris v. Thomson. 19 N. J. Eq. 313: Thomson v. Norris, 20 N. J. Eq. 525; Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 413, 42. Am. Rep. 444; Fox v. Gibbs. 86 Me, 87, 29 Atl, 940. This word, as applied to objects or purposes, may refer to those which are in their nature charitable, and may also a broader meaning and include objects and purposes not charitable in the legal sense of thin word. Acts of kindness, friendship, forethought, or good- will might properly be described as benevolent. It has therefore been held that gifts to trustees to he applied fur "benevolent purposes" at their discretion, or to such "benevolent purposes" as they could agree upon. do not create a public charity. But where the word is used in connection with other words explanatory of its meaning, and indicating the intent of the donor to limit it to purposes strictly charitable. it has been held to be synonymous with, or equivalent to, "charitable." Suter v. Hilliard, 132 Mass. 412, 42 Am. Rep. 444; De Camp v. Dobbins. 31 N. J. Eq. 695: Chamberlin v. Stearns. 111 Mass. 268: Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N. H. 535, 49 Am. Rep. 334.

—Benevolent associations. Those having a philanthropic or charitable purpose, as distinguished from such as are conducted for profit: specifically, "benefit associations" or "beneficial associations." See Benefit.—Benevolent societies. In English Law. Societies established and registered under the friendly societies act, 1875, for any charitable or benevolent purposes.

Benigne faciendæ sunt interpretationes chartarum, ut res magis valeat quam perent: at quæ libet concessio fortissime contra donatorem interpretanda est. Liberal interpretations are to be made of deeds so that the purpose may rather stand than fail; and every grant is to be taken most strongly against the grantor. Wallis v. Wnllls, 4 Mass. 135, 3 Am. Dec. 210: Hayes v. Kershow, 1 Sandi. Ch. (N. Y.) 333, 268.

Benigne fnciendæ siuit interpretatliones, propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res mags: valeat quam pereat. Constructions [of written instruments] are to be made liberally, on account of the simplicity of the laity, [or common people] in order that the thing [or subject-matter] may rather have effect than perish, [or become void.] Co. Litt. 36a; Broom, Max. 540.

Benignior sententia in vernis generalibus sen dubiis, est præferenda. 4 Coke, 15. The more favorable construction is to be placed on general or doubtful expressions.

Benignius leges interpretandæ sunt quo voluntas earum conservetur. Laws are to be more liberally interpreted in order that their intent may be preserved. Dig. 1. 3. 18.

BEQUEATH. To give personal property by will to another. Lzisher v. Lzisher, 13 Barb. (N. Y) 106.

This word is the proper term for a testamentary git of personal property only, the word "devise" being used with reference to real estate; but if the context clearly shows the intention of the testator to use the word as synonymous with "devise," it may he held to pass real property. Dow v. Dow, 36 Me. 216: Burgner v. Brown, 133 Ind. 391, 33 N. E 92: Logan v. Logan. 11 Colo. 44 17 Pac. 99: Laing v. Barbour, 119 Mass 525; Scholle v. Scholle, 113 N. Y. 261. 21 N. E. 84: In re Fetrow's Estate. 58 Pa. 427: Ladd v. Harvey. 21 N. H. 528; Evans v. Price, 118 Ill. 593. 8 N. E. 854.

BEQUEST. A gift by will of personal property: a legacy.

A specific bequest in one whereby the testator gives to the legatee all his property of a certain class or kind: as all his pure personalty

A residiuary bequest is a gift of all the remainder of the testator's personal estate, after payment, of debts and legacies, etc.

An executory bequest is the bequest of a future deferred, or contingent interest in personalty.

A unditional bequest is one the taking effect or continuing of which depends upon the happening or non-occurrence of a particular event. Mitchell v. Mitchell. 143 Ind. 113, 42 N. E. 465: Farnam v. Farnam, 53 Conn. 261. 2 Atl. 325. 5 At]. 682: Merrlll v. College, 74 Wis. 415, 43 N. W. 104.

BERDARIA. In Old English law, a sheepfold: also a place where the bark of trees was laid to tan.

BERCARIUS, or BERCATOR. A Shepherd.