object of perception, argues any weakness on the part of human thought. Here reason merely obeys her own laws; and the just conclusion is, that these two are not really two, but are, in truth, fundamentally and originally one.
Let us add, too, that when we use the words "connexion between," we imply that there are two things to be connected. But here there are not two things, but only one. Let us again have recourse to our old illustration of the neutral salt. Our hypothesis (for the purpose of explaining the present question) is, with regard to this substance, that its analysis, repeated as often as it may be, invariably gives us,—not an alkali and an acid, but what turns out to be an acid-alkali (an indivisible unit), when we examine what we imagined to be the pure acid; and also what turns out to be an acid-alkali (an indivisible unit), when we examine what we imagined to be the pure alkali: so that, supposing we should inquire into the connexion between the acid and the alkali, the question would either be, What is the connexion between an acid-alkali on the one hand, and an acid-alkali on the other?—in other words, What is the connexion between two neutral salts?—or it would be this absurd one, What is the connexion between one thing, the indivisible acid-alkali? In the same way, with respect to the question in hand. There is not a subjective and objective before us, but there is what we find to be an indivisible subjective-objective, when we commence by regarding what we imagined to be the pure subjective; and there is what we find to be an indivisible subjective-objective also, when we commence by regarding what we imagined to be the pure objective: so that the question respecting the nature of the connexion between the subjective and the objective comes to be either this—what is the nature of the connexion between two subjective-objectives? (but that is not the question to which an answer was wished)—or else this, what is the nature of the connexion between one thing—one thing which no effort of thought can construe as really two? Surely no one but an Irishman would think of asking, or expecting an answer to, such a question.
Now, with regard to the question in its new shape, it is obvious that it requires no answer; and that no answer given to it would be explanatory of any real difficulty. For, as in chemistry, no purpose would be gained; no new truth would be evolved by our explaining the connexion between two neutral salts, except an observed increase of bulk in one neutral salt; so in explaining the connexion between two subject-objects (i.e., between mind-and-matter and mind-and-matter), no new truth could be elicited, no difficulty whatever would be solved—the quantum before us would be merely increased. Some allowance must be made for the imperfection of the above illustration, but we think that it may serve to indicate our meaning. The true state of the case however, is, that there are not really two subject-objects before us, but only one viewed under two different aspects. The subject-object viewed subjectively, is the whole mind of man, not without an external universe along with it, but with an external universe necessarily given in the very giving—in the very conception of that mind. In this case all external nature is our nature—is the necessary integration of man. The subject-object viewed objectively, is the whole external universe—not without mind along with it, but with mind necessarily given in the very giving—in the very conception of that external universe. In this case our nature is external nature—is the necessary integration of the universe. Beginning with the subjective subject-object (mind), we find that its very central and intelligible essence is to have an external world as one with it: beginning with the objective subject-object (the external world,) we find that its very central and intelligible essence, is to have a mind as one with it. He who can maintain his equilibrium between these two opposite views without falling over either into the one (which conducts to idealism) or into the other (which conducts to materialism), possesses the gift of genuine speculative insight.
One important result of this view of the question is, that it demolishes for ever that explanation of perception which is founded on the relation of cause and effect. Because it has been shown that the cause, that is the object, cannot be conceived at all unless the effect, that is the perception,
