strong military power, and are not, like ourselves, within a few hours' sail from countries which maintain, even in peace time, armies which, for magnitude and completeness of organisation, have met with no parallel since the time of the Romans. It used to be the custom to believe that, in the hour of danger, we should compensate for our weakness in numbers and incompleteness of preparation by our superior courage, by extraordinary effort and energy, and by the vastness of our resources. As to our superior courage, if it exists, it would be of but little assistance to us in those days of long-range weapons and gigantic armies. But, as a matter of fact, we show by our acts that we do not really believe in our possession of any extra share of this quality; and our fortunes in recent campaigns have dispelled any credit that our neighbours might have allowed us on that score. No country in the world has been the scene of more disgraceful and uncalled-for panics than have been exhibited in England. No people, as a nation, are more alive to and alarmed at danger, whether imaginary or real, than the English; and on occasion of panic, we at once lose all idea of self-respect and of national dignity. We certainly do our best when committed to a war to bring it to a successful issue, and are sparing neither of men nor money in the endeavours we make. But once the war is over, we soon forget that it has occurred. We generally sacrifice any advantages that were to be derived from it, and are ready to believe that probably it is the last one in which we shall be concerned: we profit but little from experience gained, and neglect to take those precautions which would insure our being better prepared on future occasions.
It will probably be within the memory of many, that immediately after the great Indian Mutiny, when the massacres and disasters which we suffered, and the severe exertions and great sacrifices we had to make, were still fresh in men's minds, the Government of that country passed a resolution to the effect that in each cantonment in India a place of refuge should be constructed, in which, in case of emergency, the women and children, the sick, the treasure, and all official records, could at once find shelter, and where a small detachment of troops would be sufficient for their protection, releasing thus the main portion of the garrison for active duties in the field. We must all acknowledge the wisdom of this resolution, and give credit to the Government for its resolve to profit from bitter experience, and be better prepared for future emergencies. It was not intended that extensive permanent fortifications should be constructed, the expense of which would naturally have seriously retarded their completion, but simple and unpretending works, which would furnish neither more nor less than was contemplated in the designation of "Place of Refuge." The exact date of this resolution, which we are unable to quote, is immaterial; it was probably in 1859 or 1860, and certainly more than twenty years ago. Since that date numerous committees have assembled, and careful reports have been prepared, but, as a matter of fact, nothing whatever has been done. Not one single place of refuge has been constructed. On the contrary, one strong native fort, distant about two miles from a large cantonment in the north of India, and which was the means of saving many lives during the Mutiny, has been dismantled, and the bricks made use
