concerned about the foreign politics of British India, to trouble himself regarding the matter, until the advance upon Sarakhs, and the preparations for carrying on a line of railway from Kizil Arvak to Askabad, warned the Government that the subject was no longer to be trifled with. At last, after much delay, Sir Peter Lumsden's expedition was despatched, to the manifest chagrin of Russia, who naturally thought that as the settlement of the frontier had been staved off so long, it would be to her advantage to be able to advance a uti possidetis claim to Herat. From the time Sir Peter Lumsden's mission became a certainty, she threw every obstacle in the way of its accomplishing its task that diplomatic ingenuity could devise. Difficulty after difficulty was started; she could not make up her mind as to a commissioner; and at last, when one was named, an officer was chosen whose inferior rank in itself implied a direct insult to the British Government, and whose instructions have apparently been to treat both the mission and its object with the loftiest contempt. Upon no previous occasion in our history would Russia have dared to play with the temper of England as she has done on this occasion. But she knew the Government with which she had to deal; she knew also the embarrassments amid which we are at present labouring; and she was quite prepared to make what capital she could out of our disabilities.
With regard to the points which at present are professedly at issue between the two Powers, we consider them of infinitely less importance than the dangers that arise out of the attitude in which they have been placed towards each other in the Murghab and Heri-Rud valleys. No doubt it is our duty, as well as our ultimate interest, to endeavour to preserve for the Ameer all the territory that properly belongs to Afghanistan, as well as to place the frontier line as far as possible from Herat. But since we have allowed Sarakhs to fall into the hands of Russia without a murmur, we cannot very consistently make the possession of less important positions a serious ground of quarrel, except on the plea that we are bound to protect the integrity of the Ameer's dominions. The acquisition of Zulficar, or even Penjdeh, would in reality add little to the menace which the Russian possession of Sarakhs already throws out against Herat. If that city is to continue Afghan territory, it is obvious that it will have to be fortified and garrisoned in a way that no other city in Afghanistan – we may almost say no other city in the East – is garrisoned and fortified. And to accomplish this, the unaided resources of Afghanistan are quite inadequate. She has not the money or the engineering skill requisite to convert Herat into a fortress that could withstand, if needed, months of a regular siege and the assaults of Russian artillery. Moreover, she has no troops that could be sufficiently depended upon for the defence of so important a fortress. In other words, since by our carelessness we have allowed the Russians to creep up to its gates, the safety of Herat must entail a new charge on the British Government, unless it has made up its mind to tolerate the presence of the Russians, first at Cabul and Kandahar, and shortly after at the mouths of the Khyber and Bolan Passes. No "agreement" or "arrangement," or even the most solemn treaty that can be concocted, will now suffice to relieve us from this responsibility;
