weapons of which a present has been made to the enemy by the supineness and folly of the Government.
Referring to the conflicting utterances of our Ministers respecting Khartoum, the 'Observer' says: –
"Under ordinary circumstances it would be unjust to assume the possibility that our Government were about to embark on so insane an enterprise as that of undertaking the recapture of Khartoum after Gordon's death, with the intention of evacuating the city as soon as its capture had been effected. In the light, however, of what has come and gone, such an assumption is not only natural, but justifiable."
Notwithstanding the childish declaration, "Our policy has absolutely undergone no change," the country may take comfort from the fact that hitherto the thing which the Government have declared the most strenuously they would not do, that thing they have always done; and that if they now say they will abandon Khartoum, the chances are a hundred to one in favour of their retaining it. But although their declaration of the "abandonment" policy is in some respects only laughable, it is in others most dangerous and criminal, as being certain to increase Lord Wolseley's difficulties, by alienating tribes whose assistance is now of supreme importance, and who would gladly remain friendly, though at some cost short of their ultimate ruin.[1] Mr Gladstone's personal pledges have always been a millstone round the neck of his Cabinet; there is only one way in which the millstone can be got rid of.
The Mahdi's power of mischief consists now, not in his being able to personally lead a large force against Lord Wolseley, but in the probability of the scattered tribes along our line of communications being emboldened by the fall of Khartoum to develop active hostility; but it must add not a little to the bitterness of our present feelings to know that whatever power and influence the Mahdi has now acquired have been the deliberate work of our own Ministers; although that thick-and-thin partisan, the 'Daily News,' was bold enough to argue that the fall of Khartoum, having been due to treachery, could not be attributed to the delays of the Government, because it would equally have happened however early the relief expedition had been despatched; – that is to say, where treachery was at work the result must have been the same, whether a week, a month, or a year had been allowed for its operation! Yet with strange inconsistency the same journal sought to fix on Sir Charles Wilson, if not the blame, at least the cause of the calamity, in the following words: –
"The accusations of those who raise against the Government the cry of 'Too late' are unjustified. ... Sir Charles Wilson did not leave for Khartoum till the 24th, losing three days. ... Wilson, who might, so far as we can perceive, have been at Khartoum at least forty-eight hours before it actually fell, did not reach it till forty-eight hours after!"
- ↑ The 'Times' correspondent, writing from Cairo on the 6th March, says: "It is rumoured, from a trustworthy source, that two tribes in the neighbourhood of Korti, recently friendly, have declared for the Mahdi. This change, necessitating our retirement to Dongola, is the first direct result of Mr Gladstone's fatal declaration, which has increased 50 per cent the difficulties of our task and the dangers of our troops. Lord Wolseley's sensible speech to General Gordon's men was an unavailing effort to counteract the effect of that declaration."
