the dreadful heats which are only now beginning. The present plan seems to be, that they shall remain where they now are, until the moderate temperature of September shall enable them to resume active operations.
We fail to see any sufficient reason for locking up during the whole of the approaching summer, at a distance of 1400 miles from Alexandria, 9000 of our best troops, who may shortly be urgently required elsewhere. Berber is the strategical point of the military situation, and the primary object of our operations must be its capture. For that purpose General Graham's force amply suffices, and Lord Wolseley's army is therefore superfluous. It is a military axiom that one line of operations, and that as strong as possible, should load to the objective point of the campaign: according to present appearances, there are to be two lines leading from diametrically opposite points of the compass – Suakin and Korti, distant from each other 500 miles, without any possibility of communication between them, excepting through Berber, which is held by the enemy. If Graham's force were not sufficient, and if military considerations were alone to rule, Lord Wolseley and his troops ought clearly to be transferred to Suakin, and in this view should be withdrawn to spend the summer at Cyprus, where they would be within reach either of Suakin or India, according to need. Here we are assuming that a retreat down the Nile is possible; for if otherwise, it is a conclusive condemnation of the Nile route having been chosen. The objection against such withdrawal consists only in the appearance it would present of deserting the Mudir of Dongola, and the tribes who have shown themselves friendly. But the tidings of a decisive success obtained by Graham over Osman Digma, which we hope will soon be received, would spread like wildfire through the intervening country, and would counteract any unfavourable results that might otherwise flow from Lord Wolseley's retreat.
By choosing Suakin as our sea base, and by the resolution to construct the railway to Berber, the Government are undertaking in March 1885 that operation – namely, the opening of the Suakin-Berber road – which in March 1884 they declared to be impossible; undertaking it, too, at a time when all the conditions are more adverse, – when, instead of Berber being in our hands, it is held by the enemy and will be defended by all the power of the Mahdi, and when Osman Digma has gathered confidence and strength from a whole year's inaction and apparent timidity on the part of our troops. The opening of the road to Berber was never a question of anything but money and resolve. The construction of the railway through an enemy's country is analogous to the pushing of a sap against a fortress: as each length of the line is constructed, its terminus for the time being must be defended by a strongly intrenched garrison; and it happens that the local conditions are favourable. The first stage out of Suakin is 29 miles long to Handoub, standing at an elevation of 1800 feet; the second stage is 20 miles to El Sybil, at an elevation of 2300 feet; the third stage is 22 miles to Haratri, 2850 feet high, the summit of the line; the fourth stage is 33 miles to Wady Kokreb, at an elevation of 2300 feet; the fifth is 27 miles to Ariab, at a height of 1800 feet, which last
