THE MINISTRY OR THE COUNTRY: WHICH SHALL WE SAVE?
Every Briton understands without coaching why Mr Gladstone's Administration must avoid a war with Russia at any price which it may be possible to make this country pay. The very fact of actual war must absolutely crush the reputation of the British Government, which therefore instinctively endeavours, by every expedient known to it, to put off the coming collision. By every expedient known to it, we have said, – because the Government would appear to be ignorant of the one means by which the question at issue may be, or might have been, most readily solved – namely, that of taking up a clear and definite position, maintaining it immovably, and by standing thoroughly prepared for any result which such firm attitude might entail.
Lord Beaconsfield, while he was in office, foresaw, with the prescience of a true statesman, the struggle which must inevitably occur somewhere on the frontier of British India, whenever the Russians should be able to make their way thither. He took important steps for the attainment of British security in such a case, and he projected further measures. He had secured Candahar, and had decided upon connecting it with British India by a railway. His plans, if they had been carried out, would probably have enabled us to speak with our enemies in the gate at this moment without confusion, – at the least, they would have given us every possible advantage of position and of preparation, and have left us no ground for self-reproach in any event. The present Administration decided, soon after acceding to office, to reverse the precautionary acts of their predecessors, to retire from our points of vantage, and to leave our destiny entirely to the chapter of accidents. The crisis has come. We are altogether unprepared for it. In proof of what we advance, we refer our readers to the clear and convincing letters published in the 'Times' newspaper during March and April by Lieutenant-General Sir E. B. Hamley. These communications have been justified by events, as far as events have gone. The letter of 18th April shows plainly what we surrender if we allow the Ameer to give up Penj-deh. We shall by so doing enable two columns of the Russians to advance by the valleys of the Kuskh and Heri-Rud, and to "maintain throughout perfect co-operation and communication." These letters contain not only valuable information, but warnings also, from an expert, which the nation would do well to take to heart. The Government sees, no doubt, that it is condemned already in the moment when hostilities fairly commence. No wonder, then, that by all the many shifts which it is so fond of, it should be endeavouring, heart and soul, to avert, during its lifetime, the sentence on itself which a war will involve.
So it is clear enough why the Ministry should be willing to pay, ruinously to the nation, for peace. What is by no means clear – what it is most difficult to understand – is why the nation should pay ruinously in order that the Ministry may escape perdition. That is a curiosity in politics.
We write with full knowledge that, whether we parley or fight, we must do either at a great disadvantage; for (to say nothing for
