felt to the disadvantage of England, in the event of a European difficulty occurring between the two Powers. The Conservative Government, however, did its best to obtain an explanation of the Russian aims in trafficking with the Ameer, and have a stop put to communications between General Kauffmann and Cabul. The diplomatic correspondence with St Petersburg during the year 1876, read in the light of the disclosures which came from the side of Afghanistan, clearly show the game of duplicity and bad faith which Russia was then playing. Regarding General Kauffmann's letters to the Ameer, Russia at first, professed ignorance, then disbelief, then denial; and finally, when irrefragable evidence was produced, declared that the correspondence was merely dictated by courtesy, and had no political significance – statements which the letters themselves showed to be untrue. General Kauffmann, not to be outdone by unscrupulousness at St Petersburg, denied both letters and envoys, and finally, the despatch of the famous mission to Shere Ali, even, after these were facts known to all Europe. With a Government so prone to evasion, and so committed to a policy of duplicity, little was to be done at that time except to remonstrate, as, with the fate of Turkey depending upon the cautious attitude and moderation of Lord Beaconsfield's Government, we were not then in a position to enforce an authoritative interdict upon. Russian aggressive movements in Central Asia. But at the India or the Foreign Office each fresh step that Russia took was carefully noted by Lord Salisbury, and she was given to understand that England was an interested and attentive spectator of her movements, and that our determination to maintain the integrity of Afghan territory was only strengthened by every fresh approach in its direction.
The presence of British troops in Afghanistan made a great impression upon Russia. Observation for the time took the place of aggression; and if she did not abandon hope of ultimately effecting a lodgment in the Herat country, she was very careful to do nothing that might direct attention to the north-west frontier so long as Cabul and Candahar were in British occupation. Naturally she thought that no nation having the care of India upon its hands, and governed by statesmen possessed of common-sense, would forego the security which the possession of Candahar guaranteed. At the peace of Gandamak, Russia indirectly made known her intention to rest on the line of the Oxus, and for a time seemed as if her policy contemplated encroachments on Persia from the Caspian as a basis. It was at this juncture that the Czar gave his assurance to Lord Dufferin that Merv lay outside the limit of Russian policy. But thanks to Skoboleff's restlessness, those conditions were "created," as the Russian press said, which rendered an onward march necessary; and the return of the Liberals to power, coupled with the immediate announcement that British troops were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, encouraged Russia to grasp the Tekke country and to prepare for the absorption of Merv and Sarakhs. It ought to be widely known that, coincident with the change of Government in England, Russia addressed a despatch to this country explaining away the Emperor's assurance to Lord Dufferin regarding Merv, and relieving the St Petersburg Ministers of any responsibility which
