sia to occupy it. If, however, we desire to keep Herat out of Russian hands, there is only one way in which that aim is likely to be effected. Herat must be strongly fortified, be converted into a great place des armes, at British expense, garrisoned for the Ameer by British Indian as well as Afghan troops, and placed under the command of a British officer. It would be supreme folly to trust such an important position to Afghan soldiers or an Afghan commandant, whose gates would readily open to Russia's golden key. But perhaps we are needlessly anticipating matters. Very likely the security of Herat does not form any part of Mr Gladstone's policy; it may be that it is to be left for Russia, "at your service – take, and welcome, when you are so disposed." In the same way it may be useless to point out that the new frontier, if we succeed in agreeing on one, will speedily be converted into a base for a further advance, unless the regulation of the marches is intrusted to British officers, who will see fair-play between Russians and Afghans, and settle any conflict between them before an excuse is furnished for the former resorting to war. This is an arrangement which naturally Russia will be very loath to accede to, and which Mr Gladstone is very unlikely to press, as he has the old excuse of the unwillingness of the Ameer to fall back upon. No doubt the Ameer would be unwilling to have his frontier placed under the charge of British officers; their presence would interfere with the free passage of bribes and the free play of intrigue between Merv and Cabul. But on the other hand, since Russia has established herself inside the Afghan border, the willingness or unwillingness of the Ameer cannot be allowed to count for so much as it did with Lord Northbrook, when he used Shere Ali's disposition as an unanswerable argument for thwarting the Conservative Secretary of State.
Mr Gladstone may endeavour to persuade the constituencies of this country that he is playing the part of a great and prudent statesman in moderating our indignant feelings at the way Russia has been allowed to cheat and outwit us, and in sinking all sentiments of jealousy and resentment for the sake of averting the evil of war. Should he succeed in patching up any sort of understanding with Russia, no matter how temporary or hurtful to us in the future, his followers are prepared to hail it as a diplomatic victory, under the flush of which they may present themselves for re-election. The Premier himself is in all probability meditating a "Brummagem" revival at the hustings of the " Peace-with-honour" triumphal return from Berlin. "Populus vult decipi, decipiatur." Let us not grudge the palm-branches or spare our lungs in huzzaing; the bayonets and groans will come in due course.
Mr Gladstone may impose upon the British elector whose only anxiety is to have a Liberal Government returned to office; but there are over 253,000,000 of British subjects in India who know well how their future will be affected by the interchange of civilities that is taking place between London and St Petersburg. These know that the evil day is only being postponed, when the question of supremacy between England and Russia in Asia must be settled in another way than by diplomacy. They also know by experience that while Russia will steadily prepare for this event,
