irresponsible position with reference to the troops, had now suddenly to provide not only for his mission to Kartoum, but for the safety of the whole force, in most harassing circumstances.
News now began to come in persistently of the approach of bodies of the enemy from both sides, down the Nile from the side of Kartoum, and up the Nile from the side of Berber. Therefore, on the 22d, Wilson, taking three of the newly arrived steamers and two companies of infantry, went down the river to Shendy, reconnoitred the bank, satisfied himself that the enemy was not approaching on that side, and returned to his camp the same day, and handing over the command to Colonel Boscawen, prepared to proceed himself to Kartoum, sending off the same day a despatch to Lord Wolseley informing him of the particulars just narrated.
Now there can be no possible doubt of the view which Lord Wolseley took of Wilson's mission to Kartoum, for he describes it himself in the letter which he wrote from Korti on the 29th January, forwarding the preceding despatch from Wilson. He says –
"I am now also enabled to communicate by steamer direct with General Gordon in Kartoum, and thus to raise the veil which has so long hung round that city, preventing one from ascertaining its real condition, or from communicating my plan to the gallant and heroic soldier who has so long and so nobly defended it under most adverse and extremely trying conditions."
Here then we have the most authentic account possible (subsequently, as we shall see, confirmed from the same source) of what it was that Wilson was expected to do. He was to open communications with General Gordon, in order that he might become acquainted with Wolseley's plan, and be able to co-operate in its accomplishment. And, on the other hand, it is equally certain that Wilson understood his mission in the same sense, for on the 8th January he thus wrote home: –
"I start to-day with Stewart's force to seize Metammeh, and then I am to run the blockade and go into Kartoum to communicate with Gordon, and find out the real state of affairs. ... I am in capital spirits at the prospect before me, and hope I shall be successful. After all, I shall be one of the first to see Gordon. I am to come back again at once to report to Lord Wolseley, and shall have a long ride here again if he has not come on before I return."
When the steamers came down, they brought with them the last volume of Gordon's diary (which it is not likely that Wilson, occupied as he was, had time to read), and also a letter from Gordon suggesting certain changes as expedient in the manning of the vessels. Fully impressed with the necessity of despatch, Wilson had, notwithstanding his many anxieties about his little force, decided on leaving it in its most precarious situation; and although he himself, its commander, was responsible for its safety, and though it was still threatened with attack, he nevertheless started at 8 A.M. on the 24th on his mission to communicate with Gordon. He had done all he could for his troops by rendering their position defensible and by reconnoitring the neighbourhood; and leaving two steamers under Lord Charles Beresford to assist in the defence, he took two others for his voyage, on board of which were some officers, 20 British non-commissioned officers and men, and 180 Arabs. The following incident, under the date of
