Per Curiam
intellectual disability will be executed.’ ” 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U. S. 701, 704 (2014)). While our decisions in “Atkins and Hall left to the States ‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce’ the restriction on executing the intellectually disabled,” 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting Hall, 572 U. S., at 719), a court’s intellectual disability determination “must be ‘informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework,’ ” 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting Hall, 572 U. S., at 721).
Three Members of this Court dissented from the majority’s treatment of Moore’s intellectual functioning and with aspects of its adaptive-functioning analysis, but all agreed about the impropriety of the Briseno factors. As The Chief Justice wrote in his dissenting opinion, the Briseno factors were “an unacceptable method of enforcing the guarantee of Atkins” and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “therefore erred in using them to analyze adaptive deficits.” Moore, 581 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (slip op., at 1).
For the reasons we have described, the Court set aside the judgment of the appeals court and remanded the case “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18).
II
On remand the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reconsidered the appeal and reached the same basic conclusion, namely, that Moore had not demonstrated intellectual disability. Ex parte Moore II, 548 S. W. 3d, at 555. The court again noted the three basic criteria: intellectual-functioning deficits, adaptive deficits, and early onset. Id., at 560–562. But this time it focused almost exclusively on the second criterion, adaptive deficits. The court said that, in doing so, it would “abandon reliance on the Briseno evidentiary factors.” Id., at 560. It would instead
