Bohemia—A Foreword
By Harry Pratt Judson, LL. D.,
President of the University of Chicago.
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T has long been the settled policy of the United States not to interfere with European international affairs. Indeed, President Monroe’s famous message of 1823, which laid the foundation of the Monroe Doctrine, specifically included this principle: “In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it con port with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense.” Mr. Jefferson, in his letter to Monroe at that time, said: “Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe.” So Washington, in his farewell address, in like manner had made clear his view: “Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concern. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.”
Here we have the traditional American doctrine as regards European questions. It plainly may be enunciated in three propositions:
1. Differences among the European powers will almost never have any bearing on American interests.
2. With such differences therefore we will scrupulously avoid meddling.
3. Only in the remote contingency that our rights are seriously menaced should we prepare for defense.
Our experience of more than a century of national life has convinced us of the soundness of these principles, and further of the extreme unlikelihood of our having any direct concern in the questions that divide Europe. We have cared nothing for the balance of power, for the contro of Constantinople, or even for the partition of Africa. We have complacently looked on at the rivalries
