Page:Borden v. State ex rel. Robinson.pdf/31

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Borden Et Al. vs. State, use &c.
549

ble's opinion as judge of the circuit court of Kentucky, quoted verbatim and endorsed in gross by the supreme court of the United States in Hollingsworth vs. Barlow et al. 4 Peters 475.)

Nor do any of the cases decided in England or in the supreme court of the United States, where the judgment was declared invalid or null for want of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, in any degree conflict with our views; for after considerable search all such cases that we have been able to find were cases in inferior courts, and where there was an absolute want of jurisdiction of the person, as the Marshalsea ease, which court had jurisdiction of only such as were of the King's household, and this case was not approved in England, and was greatly modified in Truscott vs. Carpenter, 1 Lord Raym. 229, where the court said "And therefore the resolution in the case of Marshalsea was a hard resolution and warranted by none of the books there cited." And the case of Grant vs. Sir Charles Gould, (2 H. Black. R. 102) where the prohibition was asked because Grant was not a soldier and was therefore not liable to marshal law: and the case of Wise vs. Withers, (3 Cranch. R. 331) where a court marshal had imposed a fine upon a justice of the peace, who, by act of Congress, was exempt from military duty and was consequently not a person over whom the court marshal had any jurisdiction.

We might further fortify our conclusions as to the main point by a further reference to some authorities having some bearing upon it. (Buller's N. P. 244, 245. Ambler 761. Freeman 84. Str. 733. Harg. Law tracts 465, 469.) And also by some analogies in reference to the rule of conclusiveness of Ecclesiastical sentences, Exchequer and Admiralty condemnations, and by a reference to the doctrines of the conclusiveness of sales made under decrees and on judgments, and execution on adversary process: and to the doctrine of protection to ministerial officers who issue and execute process both mesne and final; but we have already protracted our views to an unreasonable length and conclude as to this point by a brief summary of the grounds of our opinion.