94, 126 L.Ed.2d 61 (1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that the right to exhibit a motion picture “by means of television” does not include the right to distribute videocassettes of the film); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 168 A.D.2d 11, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (1st Dep’t 1991) (license to distribute the subject motion pictures “for broadcasting by television or any other similar device now known or hereafter to be made known” held not to include home videocassette rights). These cases, however, did not address the precise issue presented here: whether the grant of rights to synchronize musical compositions with “motion pictures” allows for videocassette synchronization.
While the arguments relied upon by Bourne are not entirely without merit, we cannot agree that the term “motion picture” has a sufficiently definite and precise meaning as to allow for interpretation as a matter of law. Rather than referring simply to the celluloid-film medium, we believe that the term “motion picture” reasonably can be understood to refer to
a broad genus whose fundamental characteristic is a series of related images that impart an impression of motion when shown in succession, including any sounds integrally conjoined with the images. Under this concept the physical form in which the motion picture is fixed—film, tape, discs, and so forth—is irrelevant….
S.Rep. No. 72, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1971 at 1566 (providing Congress’ understanding of “motion pictures” under the Copyright Act of 1909). Peter Nolan, a long-time Disney employee, and Dr. Richard Koszarski, curator of the American Museum of the Moving Image, both testified in support of this understanding. As Dr. Koszarski explained, there is no practical difference between storing a motion picture on film, videocassette, or any other storage media. We also note that Congress adopted the broader definition of the term “motion picture” in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101. (“ ‘Motion pictures’ are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.”) Accordingly, we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518, 525 (5th Cir.1994), in which the court held that “a general grant of motion picture rights is potentially broad enough to contemplate … [videocassettes] as [a] means of distribution.”
Insofar as Bourne contends that, because videocassettes were unknown at the time of the agreement, their use could not have been within the contemplation of the parties, we disagree. While the specific technology underlying todays VCR’s was not available during the 1930s, Disney introduced credible evidence demonstrating that home viewing of motion pictures was within the contemplation of persons in the motion picture industry during the 1930s. Indeed, even in the 1930s Disney made available certain short subject cartoons for home viewing. Furthermore, Disney’s expert witness. Dr. Koszarski, testified regarding the non-celluloid methods of storing motion pictures that were under development during the 1930s.
Having concluded that the language of the grant to Disney reasonably is broad enough to cover videocassettes and that the possibility that Disney could market its motion pictures for home viewing was recognized by persons knowledgeable in the entertainment and motion picture industries, we believe that the district court properly submitted to the jury the question of whether the 1933 Shorts Agreement and the 1939 Pinocchio Agreement provided Disney with the right to synchronize the Compositions to videocassettes containing its motion pictures.
- c. Burden of Proof
Bourne contends that, even if the district court properly submitted the issue of contract interpretation to the jury, the court erred in its jury charge regarding the burden of proof. The district court charged the jury that Bourne, as the plaintiff-licensor, had the burden of proving that Disney’s use of the Compositions was unauthorized. Bourne argues that a license is an affirmative defense to a claim of copyright infringement, and, therefore, that Disney had the burden of
