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168
SUPERIOR COURT.

Bradley v. Trammel.

and explicit in aflirming the doctrine, that according to the principles of the common law before the statute of Anne, promissory notes, whether payable to certain persons or order, or to a certain person or bearer, were not negotiable, so as to enable the assignee to sue upon them in his own name.

Ashurst, judge, in Carlos v. Faucourt, 5 Term Rep. 485, says: "Before the statute of Anne, promissory notes were not assignable as choses in action, nor could actions have been brought on them, because the considerations do not appear on them; and it was to answer the purposes of commerce that those notes were put by the statute, on the same footing with bills of exchange." In Norton v. Rose, 2 Wash. Rep. 248, Judge Roane says: "It is admitted that, on the principles of the common law, a chose in action is not assignable; that is, the assignment does not give to the assignee a right to maintain an action in his own name."

Judge Carrington, in the same case, observes: "That in England, notes of hand were not assignable until the 3 and 4 of Anne, so as to enable the assignee to bring a suit at law in his own name. Courts of equity were, of course, resorted to, when the maker of the note was not precluded from setting up any equitable defence which he might have. Frequent attempts were made by the bankers and traders, to bring them within the custom of merchants, and to place them on the same footing of negotiability with bills of exchange. But the judges still considered them merely as the evidence of debt. At length the statute of Anne was procured, conformably with the wishes of the trading part of the community, making them assignable in like manner as bills of exchange. The likeness thus strongly sanctioned by legislative authority, produced similar decisions in cases where their negotiability was concerned."

If, however, promissory notes were negotiable and assignable, and stood upon the footing of inland bills of exchange, according to the principles of the common law, adopting in this respect the lex mercaloria, why was it deemed necessary on the part of the merchants, to apply to parliament for the enactment of a statute raising them to the dignity of mercantile instruments?