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The language of the Miller opinion itself answers this contention. This Court there noted decisions "holding that justification for noncompliance [with the requirement of statement of purpose] exists in exigent circumstances, as, for example, when the officers may in good faith believe * * * that the person to be arrested is fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence. People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P. 2d 6." The Court then stated that whether the rule admits of such exception "is not a question we are called upon to decide in this case" (id., 309), and continued (357 U.S. at 310), "It may be that, without an express announcement of purpose, the facts known to officers would justify them in being virtually certain that the petitioner already knows their purpose so that an announcement would be a useless gesture. Cf. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P. 2d 855; Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 541, 798, 802 (1924)."
The facts in Miller were very different from those in this case. In Miller, the police were not in uniform and the Court questioned whether the concededly low-voiced enunciation of the word "police" had been heard (357 U.S. at 311). Here, the officer showed his badge and stated, "I am a federal narcotics agent", before Toy slammed the door and ran (supra, pp. 24, 29-30). In Miller, 357 U.S. at 311:
