Page:Brief for the United States, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).djvu/50

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teered confession or the evidence of larceny obtained as a result of the confession. Human beings do normally have power to control their own speech, and, when they do choose to speak, their words, if voluntary, cannot be simply equated, without more, to intangible objects observed or discovered in the course of an illegal arrest or search.

To us, what the existing decisions^[1] show is that the question whether a statement made at the time of an illegal entry or illegal arrest should or should not be deemed admissible cannot be settled by any fixed rule but must essentially represent a judgment, based on all the circumstances, as to whether the illegal government action or the voluntary act of the defendant is the primary motivating force behind the production or discovery of the evidence. The leading case holding that voluntary admissions at the time of an invalid search are admissible is Quan v. State, 185 Miss. 513.^[2]

↑ For a list of cases, see Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 690, 691–692 (fns. 2 and 3). Other cases are noted in Kamisar, op. cit. supra, at page 83, fn. 22.
↑ The court, after pointing out that an illegal search resulted in barring from evidence all knowledge acquired by officers through their senses during the course of the search, any statements heard when the speakers were unaware of the presence of the officers, and any statements made under circumstances rendering them involuntary, went on to say (185 Miss. at p. 520):
But there there is no such an essential connection between an illegal search—wherein the illegality consists solely in the want of a valid search warrant—and statements freely and voluntarily made to the officers during the course of that search as to bar such free and voluntary statements. Even though a search is being made, and although it be illegal because of the invalidity of the search warrant, the party whose premises are being searched may remain wholly silent, if he chose so to do. And, on the other hand, any responsible and competent person is at liberty to speak as against himself or against his own interests at any time or place or under any and all circumstances, so long as he freely and voluntarily does so.

[1] For a list of cases, see Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 690, 691–692 (fns. 2 and 3). Other cases are noted in Kamisar, op. cit. supra, at page 83, fn. 22.

[p50-2] The court, after pointing out that an illegal search resulted in barring from evidence all knowledge acquired by officers through their senses during the course of the search, any statements heard when the speakers were unaware of the presence of the officers, and any statements made under circumstances rendering them involuntary, went on to say (185 Miss. at p. 520):
But there there is no such an essential connection between an illegal search—wherein the illegality consists solely in the want of a valid search warrant—and statements freely and voluntarily made to the officers during the course of that search as to bar such free and voluntary statements. Even though a search is being made, and although it be illegal because of the invalidity of the search warrant, the party whose premises are being searched may remain wholly silent, if he chose so to do. And, on the other hand, any responsible and competent person is at liberty to speak as against himself or against his own interests at any time or place or under any and all circumstances, so long as he freely and voluntarily does so.

[1]

[2]