46
the statement—nothing else appearing. As the Ninth Circuit phrased it in Takahashi v. United States, 143 F. 2d 118, 122, "all declarations and statements under the compulsion of the things so seized, are affected by the vice of primary illegality." Cf. however, Quan v. State, discussed supra; Rohlfing v. State, 230 Ind. 236. The situation is quite different where as here (in the case of petitioners) nothing is found and the defendant thus has nothing to explain away.
The decision in Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F. 2d 690 (C.A.D.C.), held that, even though nothing was found after an illegal entry, statements made during the illegal entry were the result of an illegality and therefore inadmissible. Officers, investigating a misdemeanor (an accident in which a taxicab struck a parked car), went to the home of the taxicab owner and entered the home without a warrant and without permission of the owner. The owner admitted that he had been driving the taxi and, since he appeared to the officers to be drunk, the officers placed him under arrest. In holding excludable the admission by the defendant that he was driving the taxicab at the time of the accident, the court of appeals, noting that only a misdemeanor was involved, stressed the desirability of vindicating the right to privacy of a home and ruled that the effective way of protecting that right was "to dissolve the evidence that the officers obtained after entering and remaining illegally in the defendant's home." 115 F. 2d at p. 695. This decision goes far in connecting the admissions with the illegality since the illegal entry in no sense compelled the owner to talk. Even so, that decision does not go as
