Page:CAB Accident Report, Eastern Air Lines Flight 14.pdf/24

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number of certificated dispatchers on Route 6 so that aircraft could be informed of changing flight conditions as they progressed along the airway. The distance between Net York and Miami is about 1,250 miles and it was not possible for the dispatcher stationed at LaGuardia Field to maintain adequate supervision and control over the numerous aircraft simultaneously in flight and nominally under his supervision.

PROBABLE CAUSE

Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and of the entire record available at this time we find that the probable cause of the accident to NC 21727 (Eastern Air Lines Trip 14) on April 3, 1941, was loss of control of the airplane while being operated on instruments and while encountering severe turbulence in a line squall, the existence of which the carrier's ground personnel had failed to make known to the captain.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

1. Failure of carrier to provide an adequate dispatching system with a number of trained dispatchers on Route 6 to keep in constant contact with flights in order to provide them with current and accurate flight information.

2. Failure of carrier's West Palm Beach ground station to transmit to Trip 14 the full text of the message received from Trip 10 at 8:32 A.M.

3. Failure of carrier's meteorologist to make a more thorough analysis of weather conditions and issue a supplementary forecast to that originally issued for the operation of Trip 14.

4. Although as we have previously stated, it is impossible to reach a definite conclusion as to the degree of severity of the problem presented to the pilot, it appears very possible that the handicap of the captain's limited experience in flying transport aircraft under conditions of severe turbulence was a factor contributing to the occurrence of the accident.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. The Civil Aeronautics Board now recommends to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics that unless appropriate action has already been inaugurated, he make a thorough study of all air carrier pilot training and checking programs to determine whether present procedures are adequate to insure instruction and checking in methods of recovery solely by instruments from unusual attitudes which air carrier aircraft may assume, or unusual maneuvers they may execute, while being operated.

II. The Civil Aeronautics Board recommends that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

(1) Continue and intensify its study of improved methods of classifying and describing turbulence with reference to its effects on the pilot's control on the path and attitude of aircraft;

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