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The flaps and flap actuator mechanisms were recovered with the actuators in the retracted position.

There was no evidence of inflight fire or explosion.

1.13 Fire

Air crew eyewitnesses aboard Braniff Flight 5, Air Canada Flight 627, and Pan American Airways Flight 212 indicated that there was an explosion on the water and an ensuing major fire of short duration. As the captain of Braniff 5 stated: "The duration of the major fire was . . . only seconds."

1.14 Survival Aspects

All evidence indicated that this was a non-survivable type accident.

1.15 Tests and Research

During the course of the investigation photographs were taken from inside an EAL DC-7 and a PAA B-707 aircraft. These photographs depict the outside visibility through each cockpit window from both the captain's and first officer's eye position. [1] Since head movement by the flight crew has a considerable effect on this visibility, two photos from each position were made. One was from the normal eye position while the second was from the alert position (5 inches forward of the normal eye position). A study was made of these photographs to determine at what point the crew of EAL 663 could first detect PAA 212, and to determine the attitude of EAL 663 at various points of observation by the PAA 212 crewmembers.

Traffic was given to Flight 663 at 1825:21. It was reported that this traffic was at the 2 o'clock position at five miles and below. The crew of Flight 663 acknowledged the traffic at 1825:31. (PAA 212, at the time traffic was given to Flight 663, was, in fact, at about its 3 o'clock position. This was substantiated by the testimony of the departure controller during the hearing on this accident).

From the testimony of the air traffic controller, the flight crew of PAA 212 and the DC-7B performance data, the flightpaths of the two airplanes were reconstructed. From these data it was determined that EAL initiated its right turn from a 090-degree to a 170-degree heading at 1825:43. At this time it was computed that PAA 212 was at the 90-degree or 3 o'clock position from EAL 663 at a range of 24,000 feet and 700 feet below EAL 663. PAA 212 was on a heading of 020 degrees. The approximate .JPG"> airspeeds for the two aircraft were estimated to be 180 knots for EAL 663, and 208 knots for PAA 212. Both flight crewmembers of PAA 212 indicated that EAL 663 made a very rapid right turn toward their position. Additionally the RR-7 controller indicated that the aircraft appeared to make a rapid right turn within two sweeps of his antenna. From this information it was calculated that a 35-degree banked turn was made by Flight 663.

With the aforementioned data the paths of the two airplanes were reconstructed to determine the angle of elevation of the target airplane and the captain's visual altitude limitations from his alert position at the various ranges of the target aircraft. Table I indicates the bearing, range, and angle of elevation of PAA 212 from Flight 663 in five-second increments. The right 35-degree bank

  1. EAL policy requires that captains of four engine equipment occupy the left seat during all flight operations.