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Immediately after takeoff, the aircraft would have drifted to the right because of strong southwest winds. Moderate to severe turbulence would have been encountered and should have continued while the aircraft was in the lee of Sweeney's Ridge. Drift corrections would have been made to the left and high power settings were required to maintain a positive rate of climb. The aircraft was near maximum gross. It is probable that because of the gross weight condition of the aircraft, the crew may have been more concerned with flight and engine instruments than they were with navigational instruments and that, accordingly, the initial period of the flight was spent flying the aircraft, maintaining proper attitude, and a positive rate of climb. It is possible the crew became aware that they were left of course and requested from the departure controller: "How do you have us tracking towards the -ah- Gap?" At this point, 0031:05, they were considerably left of the course and 25 seconds from impact.
Under conditions of instrument flight, during a departure, if the crew was concerned with incorrect navigational readings combined with turbulence and marginal climb performance, the cumulative demands upon the pilot would be very great.
Since no reason is apparent why the left turn would not have been displayed on the instrument panel, the Board concludes that the crew apparently failed to refer to the total instrument portrayal in the cockpit.
The investigation of this accident revealed that the lateral and horizontal terrain clearance for a runway 28 departure at San Francisco could be marginal for an aircraft operating in this environment. With respect to the radar procedures utilized, radar vectoring is not provided during this instrument departure until the aircraft reaches 1,500 feet. This is because standard vertical and lateral obstruction clearance from the adjacent terrain cannot be achieved insofar as present criteria are concerned. The lateral clearance from obstructing terrain is so critical, there is no available space in which to vector an aircraft safely until it has reached an altitude of 1,500 feet.
As far as can be determined Flight 282 was initially climbing at approximately 250 feet per mile minimum rate of climb and would have undoubtedly made a safe climbout had it remained on the appropriate standard instrument departure route. However, after the aircraft left the prescribed departure route, it entered an area of rising terrain where downdraft activity and moderate to severe turbulence affected the climb capability of the aircraft sufficiently to prevent terrain clearance. The deviation to the left was not detected in time to avert impact with the hill.
2.2Conclusions
(a) Findings
1. The crew of Flight 282 was properly certificated and there was no evidence of pre-impact incapacitation.
